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1. Introduction.
mn isthmian canal to save the long and dangerous voyage
around Cape horn I Such an enterprise had engaged the minds of
men for centuries, hut it was given to Theodore Hoosevelt, the
twenty-sixth president of the United states, to bring to a close
the long years of diplomatic negotiations and to actually start
the work of building such a canal.
The Peculiar Problem of an Isthmian Canal .
The narrow stretch of land between the two .Americas offered
a peculiar problem in the matter of an interoceanic canal. It
was this problem which made for long years of diplomatic inter-
course. It would not have existed if a strong state had
occupied this area. Instead, those states that had possible
canal routes within their borders were all without sufficient
money to finance such a project. Furthermore, they lacked the
strength to guarantee protection to any foreign company that did
build. Thus it became necessary for any company wishing to
undertake the building of a canal to first get a concession from
a Central ^nerican state, and then to secure a charter from some
other much more powerful state. This necessary combination made
for long delay.
Earlier Recognition of the Possibility and
Value of an Isthmian Canal .
The first man to interest himself in the building of a canal
seems to have been Cortez, the great Spanish explorer. He in
turn interested Emperor Charles V. Cortez believed that there
were four practical routes for a canal - Darien, Panama, Nicar-
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aqua, and Tehuantepec. (1) It is of interest to note that these
have continued to be considered as the leading routes up to the
present time.
Alexander Van Humboldt, great scientist of the early nine-
teenth century, made a study of Central and South America for
five years and urged the building of a canal. He suggested nine
routes, conceding that the four proposed by Cortez 7/ere the best
of these. Interest v/as aroused in Spain to such an extent that
the Cortes authorized such a project in 1614. Revolutionary
activities caused a setting aside of the idea, however.
In 1823 the Congress of Central .America considered the matter.
Henry Clay, at that time secretary of State in the United States,
instructed the American representative to investigate and report.
Shortly after, Bolivar called a congress at which an isthmian
canal was to be one of the subjects considered. There was
opposition in our Congress to sending representatives to this
meeting, but finally the sending of a delegation was authorized.
The canal was one of the subjects this group was permitted to
discuss. However, there was one limitation made, such a canal
must not be under the control of any one nation, but rather "its
benefits must be extended to all parts of the globe.” (2)
Shortly thereafter an American company got a concession from
Nicaragua, but was unable to raise the $5,000,000 which it was
estimated the building of the canal would cost. At about the
(1) Craham H. Stuart, "Latin American and the United States,"
P. 56-7
(2) Graham H. Stuart, "Latin America and the United States,"
P. 57
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same time, the King of Holland, who had a representative at the
Panama Congress, got a concession from Panama to construct a
canal there. A company was formed, but the revolution which was
to make Belgium a separate nation caused a postponement of this
project. (3) Bolivar himself had the Panama route surveyed, and
thus learned of the difference in the levels of the Atlantic and
the Pacific Oceans, as well as other engineering problems.
The Congress of the Central American Confederation passed
decrees on several different occasions, offering concession to
stimulate the construction of a canal, as a result of one of
these decrees in 1835 which offered the United States prior
rights, the United States Senate authorized President Jackson
to open negotiations with the governments of Central America
and New Granada to protect any company seeking to build a
canal, and to secure forever "free and equal right of navigation
of such canal to all nations.” Jackson appointed Charles Biddle
to carry. on the necessary negotiations. There v/as some dis-
satisfaction on Jackson 's part, and in his next message to
Congress he declared such negotiations "inexpedient”. Van
Buren sent John Stephens on a similar mission in 183S. The
latter had the route surveyed. (4) He estimated the cost at
$25,000,000 and declared that the country was too unsettled to
risk the undertaking.
This ends the earlier period of considerations dealing with
(3) Graham H. Stuart, "Latin America and the United States,"
P. 58.
(4) Graham H. Stuart, "Latin America and the United States,"
P. 59.
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4an isthmian canal. The more modern phase is usually regarded as
starting with the treaty made between New Granada and the
United States in 1846. This period will be considered later.
Changes in World Trade Brought by the Panama Canal .
Let us now turn to a consideration of the importance in
world trade of such a canal. Y/hy had so many men over such a
long period of time directed their thoughts to such a project?
Let us consider what the actual effects of the building of the
canal have been. What of the saving in distance? Let us
examine a few of many steamship routes involved.
Route (5
)
Liverpool to San Francisco
Valparaiso
Distance saved in Days sailing
nautical miles at 16 knots.
5,666
New York
New Orleans
San Francisco
Honolulu
Yokohama
San Francisco
Yokohama
1,540
7,873
6,610
3,768
8,868
5,708
14.2
3.5
20
16.7
9.3
22.6
14.4
What have been the results of this great saving in distance
and time? Y/hat sections of the world have most benefited there-
from? In general, we find that the Panama Canal has served to
remove a barrier which shut off some of the great producing
*
regions of raw material from the great manufacturing areas of
the world. Thus we find the great manufacturing regions of
North America and Europe brought nearer by water to the follow-
5) J.Russell Smith, "Industrial and Commercial Geography,"
P. 835.

ing sections which produce much raw material - Pacific North
America, Pacific South America, Australasia, and East Asia.
As a result we find greatly increased commerce between
certain of these sections, at least part of which is due to the
building of the canal. For example, in the first decade
following the canal r s opening we find trade between the United
States and Australia, Japan, and New Zealand increasing 233$,
while American foreign commerce as a whole was increasing but
70$. (6)
as one would expect in light of statements given above, most
of the eastbound traffic is in the form of raw materials. Petro
leum, heads the list, with nitrates, lumber, wheat, tea, and
meat following in that order. The tonnage of these eastbound
goods is about three times as great as the goods bound westward
comprised chiefly of manufactured goods, machinery, and cloth-
ing
. ( 7
)
Trade routes in the United States have been much affected.
One important effect has been to stimulate the movement of
goods from the Mississippi Valley out through the Gulf ports
rather than through the Atlantic ports. Routes from the
continental divide westward have also benefited. This has been
true in other North American countries and in South American
countries as well as in the United States, ^s an example of
this, Vancouver in the 1920-1 wheat season exported 572,000
(6) J. Russell Smith, "Industrial and Commercial Geography,"
P. 862
(7) George G. Chisholm, "Handbook of Commercial Geography,"
— P- 599,
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bushels of wheat grown in the Prairie Provinces of Canada, A
few years later this total had swelled to 53,000,000 bushels.
The reason has been that it is ten cents a bushel cheaper to
send wheat from Edmonton to Vancouver thence by the canal to
Liverpool than by way of Montreal to Liverpool,
The western coast of North and South America has benefited
greatly from the canal. It has served to bring this region
much nearer to the commercial centers of the world. The
following statement by J. Russell Smith, famous geographer,
serves to emphasize this point. "The west coast of America has
become thereby a real world empire, instead of an isolated
province."
Within a decade after its opening, the Panama Canal had
passed that other great passageway connecting Eastern and
Western civilizations, the Suez Canal. For the year ending
June 30, 1924, over twenty-six million net tons of goods passed
through the Panama waterway, while during the same period the
traffic through Suez amounted to about twenty-two and one half
million tons. It may be said, however, that while the traffic
through Panama increased steadily from its opening up to 1929,
the Suez Canal has never regained the volume of commerce which
flowed through it previous to the World War. (8)
an excellent statement of the general effect of the opening
of the Panama Canal on world trade is found in J. Russell
Smith’s "Industrial and Commercial Geography." "There is no
(8) George G. Chisholm, "Handbook of Commercial Geography,"
P. 760.
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7continent, almost no important country even, that has not made
a change in some of the routes hy which its goods go and come
by sea. Steamship lines by the score have rearranged their
itineraries, and the tramp freighters by hundreds and thousands
are unloosed from harassing restrictions and free to work their
way around the world with a freedom that redounds to the benefit
of hundreds of millions of men. The start forward in 1914, to
this, the greatest readjustment of all time, was not unlike
the general movement that follows the signal of a policeman in
a crowded street when he releases two masses of waiting men or
vehicles after a parade has passed.”
___

11. A History of Canal Negotiations from 1846 to Roosevelt T s
Administration.
We have already followed discussion relating to the building
of an isthmian canal up through the earlier part of the nine-
teenth century. During this period there was only discussion.
None of the negotiations carried on resulted in the signing of
a single diplomatic instrument. The first successful negotia-
tions leading to the making of a treaty occurred in 1846.
The Treaty of 1846 between New Granada
and the United States.—
Terms .
On December 12, 1846, there was signed at Bogota a treaty
between New Granada and the United States. It was ratified by
both governments in 1848. The thirty-third article of this
treaty related to Panama. By this article ’’the government of
New Granada guarantees to the government of the United States
that the right of way or transit across the Isthmus of Panama,
upon any modes of transportation that now exist or that may be
hereafter constructed, shall be open and free to the government
and citizens of the United States” for transportation of all
articles of commerce upon the same terms as for the citizens of
New Granada. (1)
The article continues "And in order to secure to themselves
the tranquil and constant enjoyment of these advantages--the
United States gurantee postively and efficaciously to New
Granada—the perfect neutrality of the before-mentioned isthmus,
JUJ John H. Latane.”The United States and Latin Amer i ca , ” P.149.
, A L:"'
.
•
.A
.
,
.
-
.
•)
. J ; - . . .
-« :< i «/ f*: i ifit 3xfv a i •> ; 2 t
.
with the view that the free transit from the one to the other sea
may not be interrupted or embarrassed in any future time while
this treaty exists, and, in consequence, the United States also
guarantee, in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and
property which hew G-ranada has and possesses over the said
territory. " (2
)
This article is the one over which there was to eventually be
a great deal of dispute. The treaty was to remain in force
twenty years. If neither party gave notice of termination, it
was to continue in force. As neither hew Granada nor the United
States too such a step, it was still effective at the time of
the revolution in Panama.
The guarantee quoted above of uninterrupted traffic and
neutrality was put in by the American Charge d fAffaires at
Bogota, Benjamin Bidlack. It was done on his own responsi-
bility and without instructions. Bidlack later said that the
I
guarantee had to be given to get the favorable terms given the
United States in return. He further claimed that if the United
States did not get these terms Great Britain would have. (3)
Understanding of the Treaty at the Time
The understanding at the time the treaty was made was that
the "United States was obligated by the treaty to guarantee the
integral possession of the isthmus to new Granada." (4) The
(2)
John H. Latane,"The United States and Latin .America," P149-
150.
(3)
Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 41.
(4)
Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 41.
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obligation of the United States in case of domestic disorder was
apparently not discussed.
Polk in his message to the Senate relative to the treaty said
the guarantee of the sovereignty of .New Granada was the only
"practicable mode of securing the neutral ity" (5 J of the isthmus.
The Building of the Panama Railroad .
Under the protection of this treaty the Panama Railroad
Company, composed mostly of American citizehs, secured a charter
from New Granada. It then proceeded to construct a railroad
line between 1850 to 1855 on the line of the proposed canal.
There were hundreds who died and possibly thousands, one
conservative estimate setting the toll at 835 lives. (6)
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850
In the meantime another treaty relating to the building of an
isthmian canal had been made. This was the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty with Great Britain and the United States effected in 1850i
Situation Necessitating a ireaty .
Let us first consider the situation which led to the making
of this treaty. For some years Great Britain had occupied terri-
ory around the mouth of the San Juan River under the assumption
cf a protectorate. This territory supposedly belonged to
Nicaragua and Costa Rica. However, English explorers and
traders searching for mahogany had gotten into this section as
early as the eighteenth century and established relations with
15 J Howard 0. Hill , "Roosevelt and the Caribbean,"
16) Joseph B. Bishop, "The Panama Gateway,"
P. 41.
P. 48.
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the Indians, so England was not entirely ?7ithout a basis for
her claim. The presence of the English along this coast was a
cause of much uneasiness in the United States.
The situation reached a climax in 1849. There were at least
three events of importance that year relating to the situation
in Nicaragua.
The first of these was the negotiating of a treaty by Mr.
rise, United States Charge d Affaires in Central America,
between Nicaragua and the United States. In accordance with the
terms of this treaty the United States was given exclusive canal;
contruction rights in Nicaragua. Hise had proceeded without the
authorization or knowledge of the American government, and
because of that fact the treaty was never submitted to the
United States Senate. However, use was made of it in negotiating
with Great Britain (7).
In much the same manner -fr. Squier, representing the United
States in Honduras, had made a treaty with that state.
Honduras was thereby to cede Tiger Island to us for use as a
naval station. This treaty also failed to reach the oenate,
but it was made use of along with the Nicaragua document in
bringing pressure on Great Britain. (8)
A third incident of 1849 was the finding of gold in Calif-
fornia. Thousands of people left eastern United States to seek
their fortunes in the Ear nest. Many of these men and great
(7) John H. Latane,"The United States and Latin America," P.152
(8) John H. Latune,"The United states and Latin America," P.153

12
amounts of supplies passed through the isthmus on the way west.
It raised anew the talk of a canal.
Terms
The treaty negotiations between Great Britain and the United
States started on three bases, one of which was that the latter
country was negotiating for a canal in Nicaragua. It was
further recognized that Nicaragua was the rightful owner of the
San Juan River. A third assumption was that if a canal was
constructed the United States was not to obtain any exclusive
right or privilege. Great Britain was not ready to consent to
seeing such a canal under the sole control of any other great
commercial power.
With these facts in view, Clayton and Sir Henry Bulwer
signed a convention on April IS, 1850. It was set down in the
preamble that the treaty was for the purpose of setting forth
views and intentions in relation to a canal through Nicaragua. (9
Following is a review of the more important provisions of
this treaty. The first article provided that neither country
was ever to obtain or maintain exclusive control over the said
ship canal. Furthermore, neither Great Britain nor the United
States was ever to erect fortifications commanding it or in the
vicinity of it. It was agreed that there were to be no attempt
to colonize or exercise dominion over Nicaragua or any part of
Central America. Neither country was to obtain in any way any
unequal advantages in regard to commerce or navigation through
the canal.
(9) John H. Latane,"The United States and Latin America," P. 155
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The second article guaranteed that neutralization of the
canal in event of war between Great Britain and the United
States
•
The next section guaranteed the protection of those under-
taking canal construction.
The fifth article provided for the neutralization and pro-
tection of the canal as long as it was managed without dis-
crimination against Great Britain and the United States.
The seventh article stipulated that encouragement and support
would be lent to the first company offering to construct the
canal in accordance with the spirit of the treaty.
The eighth article was a very important one. "The govern-
nents of the United States and Great Britain having not only
iesired, in entering into this convention, to accomplish a
particular object, but also to establish a general principle,
they hereby agree to extend their protection, by treaty stipu-
lations, to any other practicable communication, whether by
canal or railway, across the isthmus which connects North and
South America, and especially to the interoceanic communications,
should the same prove practicable, whether by canal or railway,
which are now proposed to be established by the way of Tehuan-
tepec or Panama. (10)
Reaction in the United States.
This treaty was to remain in effect until 1901 and was the
sause of more discussion than any other treaty that the United
States every made.
(10) John H. Latane,"The United States and Latin America," P.15C
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It was subject to some rather sharp criticism at the time it
was made, notably from James Buchanan. (11 } He held that England
was giving up nothing but its claim to the Mosquito shore, which
claim was "absurd and unfounded."
But it may be said on behalf of those who negotiated this
treaty that the time England was actually in possession of
Greytown at the mouth of the San Juan River, the Atlantic termi-
nus of the canal route. She also held the Bay Islands and
Belize. This was in line with England's traditional policy of
obtaining control in points vital to world trade. The United
States in 1850 could hardly be said to be in a position to oust
her. The Monroe Doctrine would be the only basis for attempting
such a procedure, and England held that her claim antedated
that doctrine.
Questions of Interpretation .
The treaty was no sooner ratified than there arose a question
of interpretation on two points of much importance. The first
question had to do with whether the first article applied only
to the future, or if it required Great Britain to give up the
Mosquito Coast. A second point of disagreement related to the
Bay Islands. Were these islands dependencies of Belize (British
Honduras) or of the Republic of Honduras? England attempted to
strengthen her position there by issuing a formal proclamation
converting the settlements on the islands into "The Colony of
the Bay Islands."
(11) John H. Latane,"The United States and Latin America," P.157
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England T s Treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua .
An attempt was made in 1856 to clear the situation by the
naking of a new treaty. This document known as the Dallas-
larendon Treaty failed to become effective when the United
States Senate failed to ratify it. Then followed much diploma-
tic intercourse between Great Britain and the United States. At
one time the only course open seemed to be the mutual abrogation
Df the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. The matter was finally settled
in 1859 when Sir William Owsley went to Central America as Great
Britain's representative and successfully negotiated a series of
treaties with Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. These treaties
created a situation very satisfactory to the United States. The
nost important effect of the treaties, insofar as the case
between Great Britain and the United States was concerned, was
the restoration of the Mosquito Coast to Nicaragua. England,
however, reserved certain rights to the Indians. President
Buchanan stated in 1860 that the agreement was "entirely satis-
factory to this government ." (12)
This seemed to clear the way for a renewal of the talk of
canal building. But by this time the debate over slavery and
secession had forced all else into the background. Thus for the
period of the war little is heard of the situation in Gentral
America.
(12) John H. Latane, "The United States and Latin America,"
P. 165.
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The Treaty of 1867 with Nicaragua
The Civil War had no sooner drawn to a close than our diplo-
mats again turned their attention to an isthmian canal.
as a result, a treaty was made and ratified in 1867 between
Nicaragua and the United States. The right of transit over any
possible land or water route was thereby given to this country.
In return, we agreed to extend our protection to all such routes
and "to guarantee the neutrality and innocent use of the same."
The United States further agreed to use its influence with other
nations to induce them to guarantee neutrality and protection.
It may be noted as significant of America's attitude at the time
that this treaty also contemplated the building of a neutral
canal just as had the Clayton-Bulwer convent ion. (13
)
There followed another period of quiet in Central American
affairs. Then in 1878 came a happening that greatly stirred
to Gorgoza, a French adventurer. Reaching Paris he interested
an influential group. There followed the formation of a
construction company in France, known as the Universal Inter-
Oceanic Canal Company, under the presidency of Ferdinand De
Lesseps, famous builder of the Suez Canal. (14) The International
(13) John H. Latane,”The United States and Latin America, "P. 167
(14) Graham E. Stuart , "Lat in America and the United States,"
Terms
•
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Engineering Congress was held in Paris in 1879 under the
presidency of De Lesseps. It was decided that the company was
to proceed with the building of a canal at Panama as soon as
the necessary capital was forthcoming.
Reaction in the United States .
This first serious attempt to do that which had been talked
about for centuries brought a decided reaction in the United
States. It had always been generally believed that when such
an undertaking finally did get under way that it would be an
American company that would attempt the job. It was a real
shock to have the task taken up by a European company.
On March 8
,
1880, President Kayes sent a special message to
Congress in relation to the matter. He stated that "the
policy of this country is a canal under American control." He
went on to say that the United States could not permit control
of the canal to pass into the hands of a European power, and
then continued with the contention that such a canal would be
"virtually a part of the coastline of the United States,"
because of trade between Atlantic and Pacific ports. "Its
relation to our power and prosperity as a nation, to our means
of defense, our unity, peace, and safety, are matters of para-
mount importance to the people of the United States." He
urged that any diplomatic action necessary be taken to correct
the situation. (15 ) Accompanying the message was a report from
(15) John H, Latane, "United States and Latin -america," P.168.
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Secretary of State Ewarts. He pointed out that our guarantee of
the neutrality of the isthmus and of the sovereignty of Colombia
was now an entirely different proposition.
The Change in the American Canal Policy
It will be immediately noted that such a statement was quite
at variance with American statements of several decades previous.
It shows clearly that the United States came out of the Civil
War with a feeling of increased power in world affairs.
Blaine's Messages .
Garfield saw the situation in much the same way as Hayes.
Bis Secretary of State, James Blaine, took a rather aggressive
attitude. He outlined a policy similar to Hayes' to our rep-
resentatives in Europe. This policy was said to be simply
"pronounced adherence” to "principles long since enunciated,"
(16) by the United States. This could hardly be considered as
strictly truthful. Blaine's statement ignored the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty.
He stressed three points. In the first place, he called
attention to American rights and duties arising from the treaty
of 1846. He then went on to claim that in case of war involving
!
Colombia or the United States war vessels of a hostile nation
ould not use the canal. This was directly in opposition to
rticle 2 of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Blaine's third point
was that the United States would object to any concerted action
(16) John H. Latane, "United States and Latin America," P. 169.
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by European powers for the purpose of guaranteeing the canal or
determining its status. In this paper we find the term "coast-
line” of the United States used in describing the canal. (17)
Lord Granville did not reply at length, but stated simply
that the relations existing between Great Britain and the United
States in Central iimerica in the matter of canal were governed
by the terms of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. He said that Great
Britain relied upon observance of that document.
Even before the reception of Lord Granville*s answer Blaine
had penned another dispatch having to do with the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty. This paper started with the claim that this
treaty was made under exceptional conditions, and that it was
temporary in nature and had thus long since ceased to exist.
The treaty was objected to on several grounds. It was
contended that the forbidding of fortifications practically gave
[England control because of her great naval strength. Further-
more, the treaty embodied a misconception of the relative
positions of Great Britain and the United States with respect to
interests on the American continent. Here the United States
had the "right and long-established claim to priority. " (18
)
Blaine went on to say that the entrance of other nations had
greatly changed matters. He then claimed that the treaty had
been made with the implied understanding that Great Britain would
furnish the necessary capital for the canal.
(17) John H. Latane, "United States and Latin America," P. 173
(18) John H. Latane, "United States and Latin America," P. 173
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To remedy the situation the United States desired to have
certain changes made in the treaty. It wished the right of
fortification for one thing, also political control of the canal
in conjunction with the country where it was.
Negotiations looking to the ends expressed above were carried
on over a long period. Erelinghausen, who followed Blaine, took
a position very similar to his predecessor. The .American
position was shifted a bit, relying to a greater extent on the
Monroe Doctrine
.
( 19
)
It can be seen that the United States was trying to make a
change in her policy. The state Department was kept busy
attempting to find arguments to justify this policy. On the
other hand England simply had to stand on her treaty rights.
She undoubtedly had much the better of the dispute. To quote
Latane on this series of diplomatic negotiations, "It may be
safely said that no state papers have ever emanated from our
government on so serious a question equally lacking in logical
consistency and moral force."
The result of all this was a deadlock. England refused to
piodify her position, and if we went ahead without regard to her
stand war might very well have resulted.
Notwithstanding this, Erelinghausen proceeded to make a treaty
with Nicaragua in 1884 providing for the construction of a canal
Dy the United States under the joint ownership and protection of
(19) John H. Latane, "United States and Latin America," P.175-6.
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the two countries. This treaty was before the American Senate
when Grover Cleveland came into office. Cleveland withdrew the
treaty immediately.
Cleveland’s Attitude.
—— -
- — — —
His position was diametrically opposed to that taken by the
men who had held the office for the preceding sixteen years. He
believed that the canal should be "removed from the chance of
domination by a single power. "(20) There was no further ques-
tioning of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. There was a slight dis-
cussion concerning the Mosquito Coast. This ceased when the
Indians of that region surrendered their treaty rights of 1860
and were incorporated with Nicaragua. Great Britain no longer
had occasion to interfered.
The American attitude in the *80 T s had affeated Bngland by
increasing her determination to hold us to the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty. The change in this policy under Cleveland and Harrison
did much to bring about conditions which later made the Hay-
Paunceforte Treaty possible.
The new policy may be well summed up by quoting a statement
made by Richard Olney, Secretary of State under Cleveland, in
1896. He said, "If changed conditions now make stipulations,
which were once deemed advantageous, either inapplicable or
injurious, the true remedy is not in ingenious attempts to deny
the existence of the treaty or to explain away its provisions,
(20) John H. Latane, "United States and Latin America," P.180
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but in a direct and straight-forward application to Great
Britain for a reconsideration of the whole matter. "(21)
The Hay-Paunceforte Treaty .
John Hay had much the same spirit when he set out in 1899 to
make a new treaty with England.
The failure of the First Treaty .
He managed to negotiate what is known as the first Hay-
Paunceforte Treaty which was signed in February 1900. This
convention provided for a neutralized canal and drafted rules
similar to those made by the Constantinople Convention of 1888
to provide for regulation of the Suez Canal. The United States
was authorized to construct and assume management of an isthmian
canal, directly or through a company.
The Senate was not satisfied with the terms provided. It
sought to amend the treaty in three important respects. First,
it desired that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty be thereby declared
superseded. Second, restrictions governing the use of the canal
were not to apply to measures which this country might adopt for
its own defense and for the maintenance of public order along
the canal. Third, the article providing for adherence of other
powers was: to be dropped. (22)
The Terms of the Second Hay-Paunceforte Treaty .
These amendments were not acceptable to Great Britain.
Negotiations were then renewed and lasted for about a year. By
(21)
John H. Latane
,
"United States and Latin America," P. 180.
(22)
John H. Latane , "United states and Latin America," P. 181.
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By that time a revised treaty which was a compromise between
the original treaty and the amendments had come into existence.
This new treaty was ratified by the Senate on December 16,1901
It provided that the United States might construct a canal
under its direct auspices and to under its exclusive management
The principle of neutrality remained, but was under the sole
guarantee of the United States. This country also had power
to police the canal, while the clause forbidding fortifications
was omitted. About the only condition which the United States
had to meet was that there were to be equal tolls to the ships
of all nations. (23)
An attempt at Canal Building in Nicaragua .
There was one serious attempt at the construction of a
canal in Nicaragua. This was started in 1890 by an American
company, the Maritime Canal Company. This company secured a
concession from Nicaragua. It was then chartered by Congress
and began work. Within three years its capital was entirely
gone, and the company was in the hands of a receiver. In 1895
Congress authorized a commission to report on the cost of
completing the work. An original estimate of ^67,000,000 was
later raised to ^133,000,000. Congress was not willing to
finance the project, and the matter was dropped. (24)
(23)
(24)
John H. Latane,
Graham H. Stuart
"The United States and Latin -america,"
P. 181.
,
"Latin -airier ica and the United States
P. 70.
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III. Panama from 1846 to 1902 .
Let us now go back and trace events in Panama in the latter
half of the nineteenth century.
Period of Continuous Trouble .
As has been mentioned above, a railroad had been build during
the first five years of this period. From then on it is largely
a history of revolts following one another in rapid succession.
Time and again Colombia called for American aid in putting down
these outbreaks, a total of fifty-three such revolts was
reported between 1850 and 1902. (1)
The first serious trouble came in 1856 when a riot of serious
proportions occurred in Panama City. Following this the United
States tried to get a treaty modification which would giver her
greater power in such circumstances. This was not successful.
Similar efforts were renewed after outbreaks in 1868 and 1870,
but always without success.
The trouble was constant varying only in degree of serious-
less. In some cases it was but a matter of a day or two to
Dring order, but at oth^r times quiet was not restored over a
Long period. This is notably true in the case of one revolution
which lasted from 1873 to 1875. A revolution in 1900 lasted
throughout the gr ater part of the year. (2)
(1) Theodore Roosevelt, "An Autobiography, P. 555
’2) Theodore Roosevelt, "An Autobiography,” P. 556-7
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Use of .American Troops .
On a total of seven occasions United States troops were used
at the request of the government of Colombia or the governor of
Panama. In all of these cases, wi th the exception noted below,
the troops entered with the consent of Colombia.
However, it must be said that the history of this entire
period shows that the United States regarded the obligation of
keeping the railroad transit open as belonging primarily to
New Granada and later Colombia. This T/as acknowledged by
Colombia in 1857. The same thing was pointed out once again
by Secretary of State Pish in 1873.
In 1865 Secretary Seward refused aid in putting down a local
rebellion. He insisted that the protection guaranteed by the
United States in its treaty of 1846 applied only to foreign
powers. "It could not have been contemplated that we were to
become a party of any civil war in that country." (3)
Seward later said on October 9, 1866 that the United States
would continue to maintain "a perfect neutrality in such
domestic controversies." But he continued that if "the transit
trade across the isthmus should suffer from an invasion from
either foreign or domestic disturbances of the peace in the
State of Panama, the United States will hold itself ready to
protect the same." (4)
(3) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 42
(4) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 42
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On one occasion previous to 1904 American troops entered
Panama without Colombian consent. This happening occurred in
1902 when Admiral Casey of the American Navy prevented Colombian
troops from using the Panama Railroad during an insurrection.
Colombia immediately protested the Americans action in so
doing. The protest was accepted and Hay in a message sent
October 16, 1902 expressed regret at the misunderstanding. He
continued that there had been "no intention to infringe the
sovereignty or wound the dignity of Colombia." (5)
Summary of American Policy in Panama During
This Period .
In summing up the relations of the United otates and Colombia
concerning Panama during this period there are several points
that stand out. The first of these is that the United States
felt bound to protect the neutrality of Panama against foreign
attack. It felt further that it should maintain the sovereignty
of Colombia over the isthmus against foreign aggression. A third
point of .American policy was that the United otates was to
preserve freedom of transit in case of internal disorder whenever
Colombian authorities were unable to do so, but this was to be
ione always with the approval of the Colombian government.
Lastly, the United otates was to avoid interference with the
movement of Colombian troops whenever it did intervene. Further-
more, in such cases the American government did not feel bound
(5) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean, P. 45
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to support either side in these insurrections, it was simply
to maintain freedom of transit.
These policies may be found summed up in a reply Secretary
of State Bayard sent to the House of Representatives on Februar
17, 1887 in answer to a resolution passed by that body. Bayard
said that we had sent troops in on a number of occasions
"always with the consent of Colombia" (6) to protect American
property and citizens when Colombia could not. In doing so we
always "recognized the sovereignty and obligations of Colombia
in the premises," and this government "never acknowledged, but
on the contrary, has expressly disclaimed, the duty of protect-
ing the transit against domestic disturbance ."( 7
)
Reasons for the Difficulties in Panama .
Let us now consider the reasons for this continual trouble
on the isthmus. Why do we find these revolts following one
another practically annually? The answer will be found in the
earlier history of Panama.
In 1739 the Isthmus of Panama was jointed as a province to
the viceroyalty of New Granada. Panama was one of the last of
the Spanish provinces to declare independence. It realized its
weakness as a separate state and declared its territory to be
a part of Colombia which then included Colombia, Lcuador, and
Venezuela. After Lcuador and Venezuela withdrew the Republic
of New Granada was created in 1831. Panama was one of the
y
(6) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 46.
(7) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 36
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eighteen provinces composing this new state. The constitution
drawn up at this time recognized the right of Panama to secede
at any time. In 1840 did withdraw and remained apart until 1842.,
The constitution was reorganized in 1853. Once more we find
included Panama *s right to secession.
In 1863 came another new constitution. It was then that the
present state of Colombia was organized. According to this
document Panama was organized as a practically autonomous state
with its right to withdraw recognized for the third time, in
a little over thirty years. (8)
In 1885 Colombia was under the tyrannical and unconstitutional
rule of President Nunez. Conditions became so bad that a number
of provinces including Panama withdrew from the federal govern-
ment. Nunez was able to prevent this action. He then proclaimed
a new constitution. At the convention which drew up this docu-
ment Panama was represented by delegates appointed by President
Nunez. These men were not natives of Panama. This constitution
j
took from Panama its legislature. It made it subject in practi-
cally every way to Bogota. This abrupt and forceful change
naturally was not at all well received in Panama, as a result,
we find it in a state of practically continuous revolt through-
out the remainder of the nineteenth century. (9)
The French attempt at Canal Construction .
as has been told above, the Univeral Oceanic Canal Company
had been formed in Paris in 1879 and had, decided after invest i-
(8) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean,"
(9) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean,"
P. 38.
P. 38.
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gat ion upon the route through Panama as the most practicable for
the construction on an isthmian canal. It had purchased the
necessary concession for the sum of $10,000,000.
In the year after the company r s formation De Lesseps, follow-
ing a personal investigation in Panama, made an announcement
that plans' were completed. The cost of the canal was estimated
at $168,000,000. (10)
The reasons for failure .
The story of the French in Panama is not a very happy one. It
is one of constant inefficiency, dishonesty, and lack of under-
standing. To begin with the company had decided on its route
and started work before a complete survey had been made. It
then proceeded to buy immense amounts of machinery similar to
that which had been used in digging through the sandy wastes to
make the Suez Canal. De Lesseps and his subordinates seemed
never to comprehend that in practically every possible respect
Panama was not Suez. There solid rock was to be found rather
than sand; there mountains were to be cut through rather than
level desert stretches; there yellow fever and other malignant
diseases abounded with a total lack of facilities to care for
the sick.
Thousands of the middle and poorer classes of French poured
their money with high hopes into the company largely because of
the attraction of the name of De Lesseps.
(10) Graham H. Stuart, "Latin American and the United states,
P. 65.
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While hundreds of high paid officials did little or nothing
in Paris offices, thousands of men died of fever in Panama,
Millions of dollars were embezzled. Considering these facts
there is little wonder to find progress very slow while the
company put out more and more stock:.
Finally came a complete breakdov/n in the work after the
immense sum of $260,000,000, over fifty percent more than the
original estimate, had been expended. It was estimated that
«
about one-fourth of the work was completed. (11
)
Attempt at Reorganization .
In 1894, Bunan-Varilla who had been chief engineer of the old
company went to Paris to attempt organization of a new company
to carry on the work. This company was known as the New Panama
Canal Company. France, however, had had quite enough of Panama,
and no money was forthcoming. The only object of the new company
became to sell its rights to the United States. With this
object in view, William Nelson Cromwell, a New York attorney,
was retained as American counsel. Such was the situation in
1900.
Possible Interest of the French Government.
There remains one point in relation to this French venture
which deserves mention. Just what interest, if any, had the
French government in this canal enterprise? France disclaimed
any especial interest in the company. But when we consider the
(11) H. F. Pringle, nTheodore Roosevelt," P. 303
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immense amount of money which went out from that country in the
unsuccessful canal attempt, it seems likely that there must have
been government approval.
In considering possible aims for such approval, most authors
agree that there is but one strong enough to have had sufficient
appeal. That one is, the bringing of the nitrate fields of
Chile into closer contact with Franch. (12) It seems remarkable
that the United States took up tne task and completed it just
in time to allow Chilean nitrates to pass through in the hour
of France T s greatest need.
(12) R.G.Adams, "History of the Foreign Policy of the United
States," P. 285.
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IV . Theodore Roosevelt .
Let us now turn to a consideration of the man under whom
negotiations for canal building were completed and the actual
work was put under way.
Life Previous to the Presidency ,
Theodore Roosevelt was born in New York City on October 27
*
1858. His father was a merchant of the more prosperous section
of the middle class, Roosevelt’s paternal ancestors were of an
old Dutch family. His mother had descended from the 8cotch-
Irish group who had done so much for the progress of the South
from which she came. "Teddy", as he was known, was a very
sickly child. However, with the advice and encouragement of
his father and by the use of his own iron will he was able to
overcome this tendency by the time he reached manhood. As a
youngster he was best known for his intense interest in natural
science. He had the benefit of an excellent tutor and also the
educational advantages of several trips abroad.
He attended Harvard College where he did nothing to especial-
ly distinguish him from his classmates. He was a good student,
but not a particularly brilliant one. After graduating from
rlarvard in 1880, he studied law at Columbia University.
Almost immediately after leaving college he turned to politics
Starting at the bottom by joining a district Republican club,
Roosevelt ran as the Republican candidate for the New York
Assembly in the twenty-first district in 1881. He was success-
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ful and soon rose to prominence in that body, first attracting
attention by presenting a resolution asking that the Judiciary
Committee investigate former Attorney-General Ward and Supreme
Court Justice Westbrook for "official conduct" regarding "suits
brought against the Manhattan railway." (l) Such conduct was
quite unexpected from an assemblyman serving his first term.
In his last term in 1884 Roosevelt was chairman of a commit-
tee investigating the city of New York. Information obtained at
this time v/as of much help later in life when he served as
police commissioner in that city.
Due largely to the deaths of his mother and his wife on the
same day, Roosevelt retired from public life for a time. He
went to the cattle lands of the West where he led a hardy life
for about two years. He came back in 1886, however, to run as
an independent Republican for the office of mayor of New York,
the famed Henry George being one of his opponents, in the tree-
cornered fight. Roosevelt met defeat.
Nager to get back into political life he sought the aid of
friends and obtained a position as a member of the Civil oervice
Commission, the appointment being made by President Harrison in
L889. He served in this position very successfully for six
years. His term of office was marked by a struggle with
j'anamaker, head of the Republican National Committee. It was
luring these years in Washington that Roosevelt first made
(1) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 70.
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friends with William Howard Taft, Thomas Reed, Henry Adams,
Cecil Spring-Rice and James Bryce, while his friendship with
Henry Cabot Lodge deepened.
He resigned to become president of the board of police
commissioners in New York City. He held this office for two
troublous years. Taking office with the support of practically
the entire press of the city as well as that of much of the
reform element, Theodore Roosevelt became increasingly unpopu-
lar. It is generally recognized that two things contributed to
this feeling, one was his patronizing attitude to subordinates
and the other was Roosevelt’s effort to close saloons on
Sundays. At the same time, it is generally admitted that his
work had greatly benefited the department which he headed.
Roosevelt went back to Washington to serve as Assistant-
Secretary of the Navy under President McKinley. Here he renewed
his many friendships. He took his position very seriously, and
his strenuous efforts were too much for Secretary Long at times,
who was frequently quite critical of the younger man. Roosevelt
was most decidedly a big navy man. He was forever attempting
to interest congressmen and officials in the need of a greater
and more efficient navy. Dewey’s appointment as commander of
the Asiatic squadron was due to his efforts he later claimed.
Others have disputed this, but Dewey’s testimony seems to
indicate that this was the case. (2)
(2) H. F. Pringle, ’’Theodore Roosevelt,” P. 178
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Upon the breaking out of the Spanish-American War, Roosevelt
left his position to organize the famous "Rough Riders." While
rendering distinguished service in this position, his greatest
service to his country was probably in the calling of needed
attention to the conditions surrounding our troops in Cuba.
Acting with decision and with a lack of regard for army disci-
pline at times, he undoubtedly was instrumental in saving the
lives of many American soldiers.
Then came a campaign for the office of governor of New York.
In spite of the efforts of his campaign managers to capitalize
his war record, things seemed to be going quite badly. The
chances of Roosevelt’s winning the governorship seemed slight
with the campaign practically at an end when Richard Croker,
Tammany boss, suddenly turned public opinion with a bad break.
Boss Croker insisted that a judge who had been elected with
Tammany support, but who had refused to give that body proper
consideration while in office, did not deserve a renomination.
This proved a turning point. Roosevelt won out, getting into a
position which offered a convenient stepping stone to the vice-
presidency. Roosevelt’s earlier positions as a member of the
legislature and president of the New York police board served
him well at this time. He was well acquainted with conditions.
is earlier antagonistic attitude toward labor had gone. Thus
We find a good deal of helpful legislation passed during his
administration.
... v v ; >
:
.
j j > ... ..
' j • ! *
.
y
,
{
v
t
.
-..j ...
.
'
.
$
-
' cl 1 .
.
36
Just who was behind the boom which led to the nomination for
the vice-presidency seems a bit doubtful. Most writers are
inclined to the belief that Senator Thomas Piatt, Republican
"boss" in New York, engineered the deal so as to get Roosevelt
away from New York where his presence as governor constituted a
menace to Platt’s leadership. Many of the governor’s friends
advised against his acceptance regarding the vice-presidency as
a political grave. Others, including his very close friend,
Henry Cabot Lodge, urged acceptance. After some hesitation,
Theodore Roosevelt did accept and thus when President McKinley
died on September 14, 1901, he became president of the United
States
.
The Character of Roosevelt .
Theodore Roosevelt was one of those individuals whom people
either liked very much or disliked very much. No one ever seems
able to regard him in a purely neutral sense. There are, how-
ever, a number of qualities which all admit he possessed.
The first thing that strikes any student of Roosevelt’s life
is the many sidedness of his interests. As a child he was
intensely interested in natural science. He retained this
interest throughout life, and his great knowledge of the subject
amazed people on many occasions. His love of government, histo-
ry, and politics is also above question. He read and inquired
widely about them. Roosevelt’s interest in practically all
lines of outdoor sports is well known. Hunting he was especiall;
fond of, and boating, hiking, and riding were. all attractive.
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Roosevelt was a prolific writer, and once again the variety of
subjects shows the wide range of his interests. It hardly
seems possible that one man could have found time for all this.
How can this be accounted for?
One explanation is the practice which Roosevelt had of getting
in contact with men who were leaders in their fields and
getting from them by means of shrewd questioning that which he
wanted to know. His critics claim that he made a practice of
then flaunting the knowledge thus gained. Another explanation
of Roosevelt's wide knowledge is found in the speed with which
he read. This man had trained himself to read in paragraphs
rather than in sentences, a third explanation may be had in the
fact that Roosevelt was able to do witn very little sleep and
was thus able to use the late hours of the night for reading.
A fourth factor is undoubtedly found in the intensity with which
this energetic personality plunged into things.
As would naturally be expected, Roosevelt was possessed of
unlimited energy. He seemed absolutely tireless. Along with
this went an instinct for action, a love of excitement. Despite
this, there were ti^es of which infinite patience and tact were
shown. The negotiations leading to the ending of the Russian-
Japanese War was such a case.
Of Roosevelts powerful will there can be no question. Seem-
ingly doomed to a life of physical weakness, he conquered this
and became tremendously pov/erful. Likewise none will question
His courage. Of his ambition to be useful in life there is no
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doubt. Inheriting a fair income he could have lived a life of
comparative ease, but he was not content to give all of his
time to activities which were without benefit to his fellow-
man. His love of publicity may have had a part in this.
The power of leadership is asserted again and again through-
out life. He liked people, and most people liked him and had
confidence in him. They were ready to follow wherever he would
lead. Much of explanation of this power is undoubtedly found
in Roosevelt T s ability to discern what the mass of people were
thinking. Furthermore the practical way in which he went at
most of his activities increased the confidence of people.
There is another factor in this matter of leadership. This is
found in Roosevelt T s ability to do two things; first, to coin
phrases that struck the public mind, and second, to dramatize
events so that they took on an added significance.
There is another quality which none will deny Roosevelt which
is frequently lacking in political leaders. That is the willing"
ness, even eagerness, which he had to make decisions on matters
of importance, and then to accept the full responsibility for
his actions. (3)
Roosevelt had an intense love of his family, spending hours
in playing with his children. His own happy family life made
him a strong advocate of marriage and large families. (4)
(3) Gamaliel Bradford, "The Q,uick and the Dead," P. 36.
(4) William R. Thayer, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. £55-268.
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There is nothing in the qualities noted above that one does
not admire. However, he possessed a number of less admirable
qualities which will now be considered.
Roosevelt had a faculty of taking over all responsibilities
attached to a given position, leaving his fellow workers as mere
figure-heads. We find that such was undoubtedly the case with
the Civil Service Commission and the New York Police Board. In
both cases there was deep resentment of the situation. (5
)
Another of Roosevelt's less likeable qualities was the
terrific way in which he hit at political opponents. It was
probably partially due to the whole-heartedness with which he
entered into things. This was little excuse for denouncing
Henry George as a "Cheap reformer" when he was rival for the
office of mayor of New York. (6) Nor can it serve as sufficient
reason for the vicious attack on Woodrow Wilson later in life.
There are any number of other victims of such attacks between
these two. Roosevelt always seemed able to convince himself
that his political enemies were moved by the most ulterior of
motives. (7)
At the same time, Roosevelt was willing to deal with members
of his own party whenever it served his purpose, even though he
bought very little of some of these persons. As an example of
his, we have his working with both Thomas Platt and James
laine when he was after a position in 'Washington under President
5) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 121-5, 132-151.
6) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 112.
7) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 581-588.
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McKinley. From public utterances and private letters, we know
that Roosevelt had little respect for either of these men. (8)
Theodore Roosevelt has often been denounced for his "bluff-
ing", and yet all agree that no one ever called these "bluffs".
As most of the outstanding cases occurred while he was president
of the United States, there is little wonder at this. Certainly
it is true that some of these cases did not add to the friend-
liness with which this country was regarded.
Many biographers of Roosevelt agree that a greater degree of
inward calm and poise would have added much to the attractive-
ness of his personality. (9)
Thus we find pictured a man of action, of tremendous energy
and vitality, always plunging into some new job with an un-
bounded enthusiasm and plenty of confidence and courage. Com-
bining all this with a fine sense of the dramatic it is not to
be wondered at that we find "Teddy," a name thoroughly hated by
its bearer, the idol of millions of Americans.
A General -Statement of Roosevelt's Foreign
Policy
Roosevelt has given us in his "autobiography" a statement of
those principles which he believed should guide the conduct of
nations toward each other. There is much disagreement as to
whether he always applied these ideals.
He said that he believed that the principle of action between
(8) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 120
(9) Gamaliel Bradford, "The Quick and the Dead," P. 29.
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nations should be "to have the nation behave toward other \
nations precisely as a strong, honorable, and upright man
behaves in dealing with his fellow-men . " (10
)
The nation must depend upon itself for its own protection.
It is "folly of the criminal type" (11} not to have an adequate
army and navy. Men who advocate disarmament "rarely possess a
high sense of honor or a keen patriotism." (12)
Strong nations "should act not only justly but generously
toward the weak." It is "wicked to fail in either justice,
courtesy or consideration when dealing with any power, big or
little." (13)
Thayer tells us that Roosevelt accepted imperialism and was
willing to accept any responsibilities that such a doctrine
involved. He was especially interested in the Philippines.
Roosevelt retained McKinley’s cabinet and thus had as his
Secretary of State, John Hay. Hay was ideally suited for this
position. He was polite and affable, but with a quiet dignity
and reserve. He was polished and of high intelligence. In
his dealings he was straightforward and honest. Roosevelt
claims that Hay’s attitude on foreign affairs was identical with
his own, but that they frequently disagreed on domestic matters.
Roosevelt mentions among his advisers Senator Lodge of
Massachusetts
,
Senator Turner of Washington, and Representative
Hitt of Illinois. He tells us that the men he found in office
'.an -aut ob i ography
,
" P. 418
'An autobiography," P. 419
'^n Autobiography," P. 419
'An autobiography," P. 419
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were "admirable,” and that the most useful man in the diplomatic
corps was Henry White, Ambassador to France. (14) Although he
is not mentioned there is little doubt that Elihu Root was very
close to Roosevelt and of great aid to him.
(14) Theodore Roosevelt, Autobiography,” P. 588
(
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V. Negotiations between Colombia and the United States .
When President Roosevelt took office the Hay-Paunceforte
Treaty had been completed and had only to await Senatorial
approval. The way had been cleared for the United States to
select a route, obtain the necessary concession, and go ahead.
Everything seemed like clear sailing. One would never have
ventured to prophesy that one of the most debated episodes of
American foreign relations would develop before the matter was
settled
.
Roosevelts Views on a Canal Previous to his Taking
of Office .
The first expression of Roosevelt in relation to the matter
of an isthmian canal which has come to my attention is in a
letter which he wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge on October 27, 1894.
He said therein, "I do wish our Republicans would go in avowed-
ly to annex Hawaii and build an oceanic canal."
The long and dramatic trip of the Oregon during the Spanish-
American War aroused Roosevelt as it did all other Americans to
the need of a canal. However, he was severely critical of the
first Hay-Paunceforte Treaty which came soon after the war. He
opposed it chiefly on two grounds, first for its forbidding of
the erection of fortifications, and again because it contained
a virtual invitation to foreign powers to a joint guarantee.
As to the matter of fortifications, Roosevelt believed that
an unprotected canal would weaken rather than strengthen
America's military power. He believed that the guaranteeing of
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the canal by European powers was in direct contradiction to the
spirit of the Monroe Doctrine. It was Roosevelt's opinion that
such a move would Y/eaken the Doctrine to an irreparable degree.
The second Hay-Pauncefort e treaty proved to be quite accept-
able to Roosevelt.
Canal Legislation
Matters had now reached a point where the selection of a
route and the getting under way of actual work were in order.
The necessary funds must also be provided. Thus it was time for
Congress to take action.
Interested "Lobbies.”
As in any case v/here there are to be large expenditures we
find here certain groups who are financially interested in just
where money was to go.
One such interest was the New Panama Canal Company. This
company had had two extensions of its concession in Panama, the
latter one extending the time until October, 1910. This latter
extension was of somewhat doubtful validity, having come
through executive decree rather than through the usual legis-
lature action. Having failed beyond further hope of raising
further funds to continue work on the canal, the company's one
hope nov/ lay in selling its rights in Panama to the -American
government
•
With this end in view the company had retained an American
counsel, ’William Nelson Cromwell, a New York attorney. This
man went to work immediately. He established a lobby in
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Washington and retained it until the end. Cromwell had already-
done some very effective work for his company before Theodore
Roosevelt entered office. Senator Morgan of Alabama had
attempted to have the Nicaragua route endorsed in 1899, but
Cromwell had blocked the move. Again in 1900, he was able to
have a phrase in one of the Republican planks changed from
’’Nicaragua Canal” to "Isthmian Canal.” That year he gave
<?60,000 to the Republican National Committee and charged it to
the canal company. (1)
A second group of power which was interested in the route
to be selected was the Maritime Canal Company. This company
had a charter from the Congress of the United States and a
concession from Nicaragua. It had started work at Greytown in
1890, but had been forced to give it up three years later when
its funds gave out. It was now trying to make its enterprise
a national one. It had a powerful supporter in Congress in
the person of Senator Morgan of Alabama. For many years he had
been greatly interested in an isthmian canal. After consider-
able study, he had become an ardent believer in the Nicaragua
route as the best of available routes.
Nicaragua had declared the Maritime Canal Company’s concess-
ion void, as there was no indication that it would be able to
carry through the work successfully. A new concession was
given to a group of New York capitalists, known as the Grace-
(1) Ii. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt,” P. 504
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Eyre-Cragin Syndicate. The older company had never surrended
its claim, and the two interests fought out the question as to
who was the rightful possessor of the Nicaragua concession.
Both of these groups had powerful ’’lobbies" in Washington. (2)
There v/as a fourth party in the matter of a Central .American
canal. This was the transcontinental railroads. Its interest
was in defeating all attempts at canal building, and its
method was to train its guns on the particular group that at
the time seemed to have the greatest chance of success. There
was no desire on the part of these railroads to compete with
a canal. (3)
Thus we find four powerful "lobbies", for the most part well-
financed, watching every move relating to an isthmian canal,
each grasping any available opportunity to advance its' own
cause
•
The Two Routes .
Let us consider briefly the two routes, which were generally
considered best, the Nicaragua route and the Panama route.
The Nicaragua route had as its Atlantic terminus - Greytown
on the mouth of the San Juan River. The canal would extend by
way of this river and Lake Nicaragua to Brito on the Pacific
coast. The total distance would be 170 miles. The lake was
110 feet above sea level, and there was between its western
shore and the ocean land extending to a maximum height of 154
feet
.
(2) John H. Latane,"The United States and Latin America," P.183
(5 ) John K. Latane,’’The United States and Latin America , " P.183
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There were several serious objections to this route. One of
these was the lack of harbors at the terminals. There was at
Greytown the San Juan delta which would necessitate a great
amount of dredging. On the Pacific side Brito had no harbor at
all, and immense breakwaters would have to be constructed.
Another serious objection was the great rainfall at Greytown
where there was a total precipitation of nearly 3CC inches a
year.
jx canal through Panama would be much shorter than one in
Nicaragua. Here the distance would be but 50 miles, less than
one-third of that of the more northern route. The Atlantic
terminus would be at Colon while the canal would enter the
Pacific at Panama City. Another advantage of this route was
the presence of a good harbor at each end. The Panama railroad
extended along this route.
There were, however, also disadvantages in Panama. One of
these was the unhealthfulness of the region. As a result labor
was scarce and inefficient. Another disadvantage was that the
natural elevation of the land was nearly double that in Nicar-
agua. a third factor was the heavy rainfall at Colon, from.
120 to 140 inches per year. The geologic structure of the land
(4)
constituted an unfavorable element as it was of volcanic origin.
Investigating Committees .
The United States had been investigating the Nicaragua route
for a number of years. One committee had made a report in 1895,
(4) John H. Latane,”The United States and Latin America," P.145-
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while another had reported two years later. In both cases the
reports were of a very favorable nature.
In May, 1901, President McKinley had appointed the Isthmian
Canal Committee which was to make a thorough investigation of
all possible routes. The committee was headed by admiral
Walker and had available an appropriation of $1,000,000 to
meet any necessary expenses*
In November, 1901, the committee submitted its report. The
cost of building a canal through Nicaragua was estimated at
$189 , 864,062, while if Panama was chosen the construction cost
would be $144,233,358. However, for the canal through Panama
there w ould be an additional cost of $109,141,500 for acquiring
the rights of the New Panama Canal Company. This would bring
the total cost to $253,374,858 which would be over ,<60,000,000
greater than for Nicaragua canal. Because of this difference
in cost the Nicaragua route was recommended as the ’’most
practicable and feasible ." (5 ) It was, however, stated in the
report that the committee was of the opinion that the I'rench
interests were worth not more than $40,000,000.
The Hepburn and Spooner Bills .
Soon after Congress convened Representative Hepburn intro-
duced a bill in the House providing for the construction of a
canal through Nicaragua. On January 9, 1902 this bill was
passed by a vote of 308 to 2.
(5) John H. Latane, ’’The United States and Latin America,’’
P. 184.
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However, there was one individual who was determined to win
over the United States to the Panama route. This person was
Philip Bunau-Varilla. Bunau-Varilla had gone to Panama in
1884 to work as chief engineer in the construction of the
canal. It was he who tried to revive interest and raise funds
for continuance of the work in the 90 T s. Failing in that he
turned to an attempt to sell the French rights to the United
States
•
He came to this country in January, 1901, to carry on his
campaign. He had made careful plans before his arrival. First
he was to conduct an educational campaign. Having met some
Ohio people in Paris, he made use of their acquaintance to
arrange a meeting with Mark Hanna. He met this great political
leader from Ohio in March, and was able to convince him that
the Panama route was much the better of the two under discussio
Soon after he issued a booklet entitled "Nicaragua or
Panama?" which set forth the advantages of the latter route.
He next was fortunate in meeting Charles G. Dawes, Comp-
troller of the Currency, in New York. Dawes promised to
present the French engineer to McKinley. The promise was made
good and Bunau-Varilla met the President in April. McKinley's
reaction was favorable, although he did not seem nearly as
deeply impressed as Hanna had been.
Feeling that nothing further could be done for a time,
Bunau-Varilla returned to France. Then came two events which
were decidedly startling to him. First came the death of
MnKi nifty, Bunau-Varilla had been planning much on Hanna's
i
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influence with the dead president. He knew that the Ohian
would not have nearly as important an influence with Roosevelt.
Soon after came news of the Walker report.
Bunau-Varilla now knew that the situation was a desperate
one. He knew that it must be ^40,000,000 or nothing. Thus he
got into immediate touch with Marius Bo, the president of the
company, and placed the situation before him. As a result a
directors meeting was called on January 4, 1902, and the price
asked for the company f s rights was reduced to -|?40,000,000. (6
)
This information was forwarded by President Roosevelt to
the Walker Committee. This committee then submitted a supple-
mentary report on January 18 and changed its recommendation to
the Panama route. (7)
The Hepburn bill had already passed the House placing the
canal route in Panama. As a result the debate on the matter
came in the Senate. It lasted for months and was of a very
vigorous nature. As was to be expected Morgan of Alabama led
the fight for Nicaragua, while Hanna worked effectively for the
other route.
It was in this connection that Hanna made his best known
speech in the Senate on June 5 and 6. This speech was not of
an emotional nature, but dealt rather with figures, maps and
blueprints
• (8
)
(6) H. F . Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 306.
(7) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 306.
(8) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 307
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Nature took a part in this debate which was of great aid
to the exponents of Panama. Bunau-Varilla in his pamphlet on
the relative merits of Nicaragua and Panama had pointed out
that the former country was in active volcanic region. 'This
had not much force at the time, but on May 6 there occurred
the eruption of Mount Pelee which took many lives. Then on
the 14th came an eruption of Mount Monatombo in Nicaragua.
While the damage was not great, the occurrence had a decided
effect in this country. People who had supported the Nicar-
agua route became doubtful.
One of Morgan’s most effective thrusts of the Panama route
was that the French canal company could not give a clear title.
To meet this objection Senator Spooner proposed an amendment
which was practically a new bill to the Hepburn bill.
This amendment authorized President Roosevelt to acquire
the New Panama Canal Company’s rights for ^40,000,000, and to
acquire from Colombia perpetual control of a strip of land not
less than six miles wide extending from the -Atlantic to the
Pacific Oceans. As soon as these rights 7/ere acquired the
President was to proceed with the construction of a canal.
It was stated further that if the President was unable to
get a satisfactory title from the French or control of land
from Colombia "within a reasonable time and upoq reasonable
terms,” (9) then he was to get a strip through Nicaragua and
proceed there.
(9) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 508.
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The amended hill passed the Senate on June 19, 1902 by a
vote of 67 to 6. The House also passed it after a slight
delay with but little opposition. It was signed by President
Roosevelt on June 28.
Attorney-General Knox was sent to Panama to investigate
the French title. He reported that a clear title could be
given. That left only but one obstacle in the way of the long-
talked of canal, and that was the acquisition of the stipulated
land in Panama.
The Hay-Kerran Convention .
The Mak i ng of the Treat:-/ .
Discussion relating to a treaty was started between Jose
Concha, the Colombian minister of the United States, and John
Hay. From the first there was considerable friction. Concha
finally became disgusted with proceedings and went home,
leaving his assistant, Herran to carry on the negotiations. (10
)
It was Concha r s contention that the United Utates was
demanding too much. He felt that to give in would meen a
surrendering of sovereignty on the part of Colombia.
There were two points upon which the disagreement centered.
In the first place, Colombia wished the right to reach a
separate agreement with the Hew Panama Canal Company. Undoubt-
edly she hoped to get a share of the ,)40,000,000 which the
United Utates was to pay the company for its rights. On the
(10 ) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 309.
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other hand, this country insisted that this matter he settled
by a provision in the tr aty.
Colombia also objected to the presence of American courts
in the canal zone which provision was insisted on by the
United States. (11)
Negotiations were at a standstill in December 1902, and Hay
sent a telegram to Colombia threatening a substitution of the
Nicaragua route. Finally on January 22, 1903 Herran signed
the convention.
According to the terms of the treaty the United States was
to have a permanent lease on a strip of land six miles wide.
In return the United States was to pay Colombia ^10,000,000
in cash and an annuity of i250,000.
In March the Hay-Herran Treaty was ratified by the American
Senate. The matter rested for a time awaiting action by
Colombia. Let us study the reaction of the Colombian people
to the treaty.
The Public Opinion in Colombia .
Beaupre, the United States minister to Colombia, kept in
close touch with the State Department as to the reaction of
the treaty in that country. On March 30, soon after the
treaty *s ratification by the American Senate, he telegraphed
to the State Department stating that public opinion in
Colombia was strongly against ratification. He went on to say
(11) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt,” P. 310
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that there was a feeling that the United. States, as the strong-
er nation, was attempting to take advantage of Colombia, and
that the treaty gave the former country all the best of it.
Instructions were then sent to Beaupre to inform the
Colombia government that "any modification whatever of the
terms of the treaty" (12) would be considered as practically a
breach of faith on Colombian part.
Again on June 9 there went a further warning to the South
American country. (13) This was of a most unusual nature for
a peacetime document.
It stated that the United States felt that Colombia did not
appreciate "the gravity of the situation." It said that
Colombia had initiated the canal negotiations, and the the
United States had accepted with "slight modifications".
Because of this Congress had reveresed its decision on the
Nicaragua route. Delay in ratification or rejection of the
treaty might compromise "the friendly understanding between the
two countries - and - action might be taken by Congress next
winter which every friend of Colombia would regret." (14)
Of this message Beaupre siad that it "created a sensation"
and had been interpreted as a "threat of retaliation." (15)
Colombia’s minister in this country attempted to find out
just what the "action" which Congress would take would be,
(12) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 52.
(13) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 53.
(14) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 54.
(15) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 312.
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but was not successful in getting a definite answer.
Rejection of the Treaty by the Colombian Senate
The long delay on Colombia's part was getting on the nerves
of President Roosevelt. In a letter to Hay on July 14, 1903 he
made reference to Colombia as "contemptible little creatures
in 3ogota." He said that they were "imperiling their own
future." (16)
However, there was little of a hopeful nature in Beaupr&'s
dispatches. He again warned that there was a "tremendous tide
of public opinion against the canal treaty in Colombia ." (17
)
There the government had issued a circular to the press
inviting discussion. The reaction in the press showed it to
be against the treaty.
President Harroguin had called a session of the Colombian
Congress which met June 20. In his i^essage to that body he was
entirely noncommittal. Larlier he had apparently favored
ratification. He said that the government must either ratify
the treaty with a loss to its sovereignty, or refuse and sacri-
fice a great financial opportunity.
On July 15, the treaty was submitted to a special committee
of nine. This committee reported on August 4, and the report
included a number of amendments which changed the treaty materi-
ally.
(16) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 311
(17) John H. Latane, "United State's and Latin America, P. 186
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At this time Eay informed Colombia that "no additional pay-
ment” by the United States can hope for approval by the United
States Senate." Furthermore any amendment whatever would
imperil the treaty." (18)
After a two month period of discussion, the Colombian Senate
unanimously rejected the treaty on August 12, 1903. It seemed
to feel quite certain that Roosevelt would not turn to Nicar-
agua.
A senatorial committee then drafted a new report in which it
vas suggested that the amount of indemnity should be increased
and the terms made better for Colombia .( 19
)
Why had Colombia rejected the treaty? That is a question
vhich has aroused a great deal of discussion.
Roosevelt and his supporters have always maintained that
Riere was but one reason for the failure to ratify. This was
;hat Colombia was waiting for another year to pass, at the end
>f which time the concession which had been granted the French
jompany with legislative sanction would expire. It has been
intained by this group that Colombia would then declare the
tension given by executive decree illegal and would annul it.
Colombia would then get the money which was to go to the New
Panama Canal Company. Roosevelt believed that Marroquin, as
iictator of Colombia, had absolute power to take any action he
pleased.
(18) J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," P. 276
(19) G. H. Stuart, "Latin America and the United States," P.78
Reasons for the Rejection.
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Most students of the situation are not inclined to agree with
Roosevelt on this point. Taking as evidence the continued
reports of Mr. Beaupre from Bogota as to how strongly public
opinion in Colombia opposed ratification, they contend that any
attempt on Marroquin 's part to secure approval of the treaty
would have resulted in a revolution and his overthrow from
power.
. On the other hand it must be admitted that money played an
important part. It seems to be largely a question as to whether
this attempt to get more money is to be considered as something
in the nature of a hold-up, or as simply an effort to get what
nas considered a fair price.
On July 9, 1905, Beaupre had telegraphed that the addition
Df $5,000,000 to the American offer and $15,000,000 from the
French company would bring ratification. There is evidence that
Later the sum to be had from the French was reduced to $10,000,
)00. Beaupre had suggested in his dispatches that Colombia be
illowed to have some of the French money, but Hay was not in
favor of this. Roosevelt was even more strongly opposed. In
i letter to Hay on August 14, 1903, he had objected to this
proposition, writing that "they want to make a party to the
^ouge. " ( 20
)
There is much evidence to indicate that Colombia was not at
ill unjust in her claims for larger compensation. Hill points
(20) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 314
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out that in the first ten years of operation the canal brought
the United, otates xuOi-e than ylOC , CCC, CCO . lor the year ending
dune 30, 1924, the tenth year after its completion, ,ross
receipts exceeded expenditures by ^17,000,000. In 1921, Henry
C. Lodge, Roosevelts most staunch defender, estimated the
value of Colombian claims in Panama at ^50,146,942.75.(21) Thus
Colombia’s request for another ^15,000,000 can hardly be looked
on, in the light of today at any rate, as an attempt at hold-up*
In addition to the money question, it seems generally agreed
that a large proportion of the Colombian people felt that the
treaty surrendered much of the country’s sovereignty.
The making of the Hay-Herran Treaty and the attempt of the
American administration to force Colombia to accept it are
points around which much criticism has centered.
Hill speaks of the constant pressure exerted by the United
States, and goes on to say that "The United States manifested at
times an aggressiveness rarely found in friendly diplomatic
intercourse •
”
He attacks the spirit shown by the administration on the
follow-ing grounds. First, because it showed an utter disregard
for the Colombian people or their representatives. Secondly,
because it insisted that the treaty be ratified - "exactly in
(21) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 51.
Criticisms of Policy of the United States
In the Lilaking of the Hay-Herran Treaty .
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its present form" - as Minister Beaupre notified the Colombian
government, ^ny change said the United States would be "practi-
cally a breach of faith on the part of the government of Colom-
bia." Third, because it continually implied ill faith whenever
there was any attempt on Colombia T s part to do any thing
differently from the course planned by the United States. And
fourth, because it frequently made veiled threats of retaliation
especially the statement that Congress might take action "that
every friend of Colombia would regret. "(22)
Enlarging upon the second of these points, Hill tells of the
frequency with which the United States Senate has amended
treaties. For that matter, it has made changes of sufficient
gravity in the first Hay -Paunceforte Treaty but three years
previous, to cause its rejection in the amended form by Great
Britain*
There is another feature of the Kay-Herren negotiations
upon which the United States may not look with pride. This
is the use of statements of doubtful veracity in its dispatches.
The most outstanding case of this was when one of the messages
from this country contained the statement that the Congress of
the United States had reversed its previous decision favoring
Nicaragua because of the agreement which had been reached with
Colombia. This certainly could not have been the case as the
Spooner Act had been passed a full seven months before the Hay
Herran Treaty was signed. (23)
(22) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 52.
25) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 53
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0ns matter which has been widely discussed is the reason for
the absolute insistence of Hay and Roosevelt that Colombia was
not to deal directly with the New Panama Canal Company. Many
iave felt that there was a connection between Cromwell’s very
frequent letters and visits to Hay and this policy. Hay had
aotified the Colombian government that ’’this government has no
eight to impose new financial obligations upon the canal
3ompany (24). A defense may be found for Hay’s policy.
The canal company had set $40,000,000 as the price that it
wanted for its rights. Roosevelt had passed this along to the
Walker commission who had then changed its recommendation.
Congress had later passed the Spooner amendment. Everyone had
acted with the assumption that the New Panama Canal Company was
to get the money for which it had agreed to sell. Even though
it is true that the canal company would have accepted less had
it been forced to, it seems that the administration was acting
entirely within its rights and in good faith in insisting that
the Company get its $40,000,000. There seems to have been a
aoral obligation for the United States to have done this.
What is the reason for this attitude that the United States
issumed during these negotiations? The answer lies in the view
;hat both Hay and Roosevelt held of Colombian politicians.
Bishop quotes Hay as saying to him that he had no use for
Colombian politicians
.
(25 ) .as to Roosevelt’s feelings, there
[24) J. B. Bishop, ’’Theodore Roosevelt and His Time,’’ P. 276 .
'
25 ) J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, P. 279
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are any number of quotations which display his contempt.
.among these we find such classifications as "the foolish and
homicidal corruptionists in Bogota,” and the ’’contemptible
little creatures in Bogota,” and the "blackmailers” of Colombia.
Under these circumstances there is little cause to wonder that
the Colombian representatives frequently found themselves
treated as inferiors.
Roosevelts Reaction to Colombia’s Rejection .
As has been told above, President Roosevelt grew increasing-
ly impatient at the long delay on the matter of the canal. Herej
was an enterprise that had been dear to his heart for years, a
thing which he felt to be of paramount importance to the
country’s commerce and safety, and now that negotiations had
reached a point where the actual work seemed just about to
begin, a group of corrupt politicians was delaying everything
for the sole purpose of personal enrichment. So it was that
Roosevelt saw the situation. Little wonder that he chafed
under the delay.
His correspondence at the time gives evidence of his
impatience. In September, he wrote the letter to Kay including
the ’’foolish and homicidal corruptionists in Bogota" (26)
phrase. The following month, he wrote to Mark Hanna that his
patience was becoming exhausted.
(26) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 312.
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Examining the situation he wrote to Hay sating that there
were two alternatives; either Nicaragua could be selected, or
we could try "in some shape or way to interfere--so as to
(27)
secure the panama route without further dealing "with Colombia.
He rejected the idea of fomenting a revolution in Panama.
Writing of this to Dr. Albert Shaw, editor of the "review of
Reviews," on October 10, 1903, he said he would "be delighted
if Panama were an independent state." However, he went on to
say that such a statement made publicly would result in a
revolution, and therefor could not be made. To do such a
thing, would be beneath the dignity of the United States.
Similar sentiments were expressed privately to others.
Moored Plan .
John Bassett Moore, then teaching at Columbia University
and already recognized as an authority on international law,
drew up a plan relative to Panama which eventually came to the
attention of Roosevelt. The President was quite interested
and invited Moore to confer with him at Oyster Bay which he
did.
Moore’s argument ran about as follows. The United States
in building the canal was doing "a work not only for itself
but for the world". Referring to the Treaty of 1846 which
gave the government and citizens of the United States free and
open transit across Panama, Moore insisted that the United
States had had to depend upon itself for this privilege which
(27) J. 3. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and His Time," P.278.
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had been guaranteed hy Colombia. It was said that the position
of the United States government y/as different from that of
private capitalists. The United States once on the ground
could meet questions as they arose.
This fitted in well with Roosevelt *s ideas on the subject,
and so he soon after wrote to Hay that we should start the
canal if "we have a color of right." Writing to Hanna along
the same line on October 5, 1903, he said we were "certainly
justified in morals and therefore justified in law" in saying
that the canal must be built, and Colombia must not stop it.
Formulating a plan based on tioore's memorandum, Roosevelt
went ahead in preparation of a message to Congress on the
subject. He worked on this during October.
At the same time it must not be supposed that the President
was entirely unaware of the activities of certain groups
interested in a revolution in Panama . Roosevelt later insisted
that he had "no p evious knowledge -except as was available to
any person who read the newspapers" of the revolution. He
said he had no remembrance of Cromwell as one of his callers
at this time, but that if he was, there had been no talk of an
approaching revolution in Panama. His understanding was that
Cromwell "had nothing to do with the revolutionary movement •"( 2$
This stand of Roosevelt T s seems open to question. He
personally saw Cromwell on two occasions at this tine, and
)
(28) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 319
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also saw Bunau-Varilla. Both of these men were in constant
contact with Hanna and Kay, who in turn saw Roosevelt frequently
3unau-Var ilia
,
v/hose truthfulness is undoubtedly open to
question, claims that the success of the revolution in Panama
was due to his conferences with Loomis, Hay and Roosevelt, Even
allowing for Bunau-Varilla 's boastfulness, there is truth in
his claim to having conferred with the men above named, and as
the promotion of a revolution in Panama was his chief aim at
(29
the time, it seems unlikely that the subject was not discussed.
Then again there were reports of the State Department which
emphasized the dissatisfaction of the Colombian troops in
Panama. These men were not properly fed and were without pay.
Jnder the conditions they were certainly open to bribery. All
seemed ripe for a revolution. There were also reports which
were sent by Beaupre from Bogota telling of the predictions of
the Panama senators to the Colombian Congress. These men freely
predicted a revolution in case the treaty was not ratified.
Another source of special information to the President was
a meeting arranged with two army officers, Captain Humphrey and
Lieutenant Murphy, who had just returned from Panama. The
meeting took place on October 16th. Lieutenant Murphy, now a
member of one of New York's largest brokerage houses, tells of
answering many questions poured at him by Roosevelt at this
conference. These two men had seen every evidence in Panama of
(29) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 54
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a coming revolution, and passed on this information to the
President
. (30
)
Considering all of these sources of information, it seems
hardly likely that President Roosevelt could not have known
none about the approaching revolution than the average person
"who read the newspapers.”
John Hay was always equally insistent of his lack of know-
ledge concerning doings in Panama. One of his official messages
sent later to Colombia stated that "any charge that this govern-
ment, or any responsible member of it, held intercourse, whether
official or unofficial, with agents of revolution in Colombia,
is utterly without justification." This statement certainly
cannot be considered as a truthful one, considering Bunau-
Var ilia's conferences with Loomis, Hay and Roosevelt. Bunau-
Varilla certainly was without any question of doubt an "agent of
revolution in Colombia," and the three men were all undoubtedly
"responsible members" of "this government."
[30) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt t! P. 321

VI The Revolution in Panama
Reaction in Panama to Colombia T s Rejection of the Treaty .
The rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty was a last straw to
nany of the people of Panama* The Colombian rule was not at all
popular and had not been for years, as evidenced by the many
revolts mentioned above.
Now here was the hope of a canal, which was undoubtedly to
be of great benefit to the people of Panama, being wiped out
by the action of the Colombian Congress. It seemed to the
people of Panama as if there was in Colombia absolutely no
consideration of their welfare. Threates of another revolt
had been in the air before the congress met in case the action
taken was not favorable.
At about this time Colombia had appointed a new governor to
Panama. This man, Abaldia, accepted with the understanding
that if there was a revolt in Panama during his term of office
he would stand by the People of the province. It is a mystery
why a man should have been appointed who felt that way. It
would seem as if Colombia v/ould want a roan in the office at
the time upon whom they could rely. None of the writers on
the subject throw any light on the matter.
When news of the failure to ratify the treaty came to
Panama, a number of the patriotic leaders organized. Some of
their leaders conferred with the representatives of the Panama
Railroad and Steamship Company, which was a subsidiary of the
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New Panama Canal Company. Prom this point there is a close
connection between the activities of these two groups. There-
fore, the work of the two most active representatives of the
canal company, Cromwell and Bunau-Varilla
,
will next be con-
sidered.
Activities of Cromwell and Bunau-Varilla
.
At the news of the treaty’s rejection, all connected with
the canal company were discouraged. Cromwell, however, felt
that all was not yet lost
,
and went to Prance to advise with
company officials there.
The first direct contact between the group in Panama Y/ho
were working for revolution and the canal company representa-
tives in the United States was a visit to this country by
Captain Beers, an employee of the railroad company. (1) He
conferred with Cromwell and apparently received some assurances
of support. At any rate, soon after we have the arrival in
New York of Dr. Manuel Amador, one of the leaders of the
Panama patriots. It might be mentioned that this man was the
railroad company’s physician, another proof of the close
connection that the canal company had with the instigation and
encouragement of the revolt.
Amador went to Washington where he tried to get assurance
of American support. It was apparently not forthcoming, and
he returned to New York. A conversation with Cromwell there
(1) K. C. Hill, ’’Roosevelt and the Caribbean,” P. 56
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also failed to give encouragement, A leak had developed, and
Cromwell was proceeding very cautiously. When all seemed hope-
less to the Panama representative, Bunau-Varilla arrived from
Prance. He met Dr. Amador at the Waldorf-Astoria on October
14. Buanau-Varilla later claimed that this was the birthplace
of the Republic of Panama. He tells that he offered to supply
^100,000 to finance the revolution, and gave Amador a proclama-
tion of independence and a constitution. In return, Panama
was to request him to be its first representative in the United
States. It was planned that the revolution would come on
November 3. (2)
Preparations for the revolt .
Amador arrived back in Colon on October 27. On that night
the group of patriots met at the home of H. G. Prescott,
another railroad employee. The assurances brought back by Dr.
Amador were disappointing to the revolutionists. They had
apparently been hoping for promises of aid directly from the
government at Washington. Some apparently favored putting off
the revolt, for a time at least.
Soon after Bunau-Varilla telegraphed when they might expect
[American naval vessels to arrive. This seems to have been
entirely guesswork on his part. Heading of the leaving of
various American cruisers from southern and western parts, he
surmised their probable destination and estimated the length of
’2) H. P. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt". P. 323.
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time it would take to get to the ports of Panama. However, it
was a source of encouragement to the leaders in Panama.
Meanwhile, military preparations had been started. The fire
brigade at Panama City had been formed into a company and
started drill. A group of the railroad employees had also been
organized as a military unit and started drilling.
General Huertas, in command of the Colombian troops in
Panama, was bribed to desert and join the revolutionists. He
vas to act as their commander-in-chief. His men were also
bribed. Governor mbaldia, who was in sympathy with Panama, was
to be placed under friendly arrest. Colonel Bhaler, superin-
tendent of the railroad, was to see that all rolling stock was
at x3anama City, so that troops landing at Colon would not be
be able to get to the Pacific Coast city where the revolt was
to be centered.
The Hevolt .
Because of the rumors of coming trouble in Panama, the Navy
Deoartment ordered several cruisers to proceed southward. On
October 19 the "Boston" was ordered to proceed to Ban Juan del
3ur, in Nicaragua. The "Atlanta" went to Guantanomo, Cuba,
while the "Dixie" sailed with the destination unstated. On
October 30, the "Nashville" was ordered to Colon.
The "Nashville" arrived £\t Colon on November 2, at six-thirty
in the evening
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On that day the Navy Department had sent instructions to
officers in command of vessels bound for Panama to "maintain
free and uninterrupted transit" on the isthmus. If this was
threatened by armed force they were to "occupy the line of
railroad", and prevent any troops, government or insurgent,
from landing "at any point within 50 miles of Panama." (5)
Commander John Hubbard of the "Nashville" did not receive
his cable. Therefore when 500 Colombian soldiers landed at
Colon from gunboat Cortagena a few hours after his arrival, he
did nothing. On the following morning, however, he cabled
Washington explaining the situation and asking for instructions.
In the meantime, the revolutionists, having heard of the
landing of the troops, were quite depressed. In spite of this,
plans were carried out. At eight o’clock on the morning of
November 3, Superintendent Shale r met Generals Tovar and Amaya,
who were in command of the new troops. There was a train,
consisting of a locomotive and one car, ready to take the
generals to Panama City. It was explained by Shaler that trans-
portation would be provided at ten o’clock for the troops. The
two generals hesitated for a time, not wishing to go on without
men. Reassuring them, Shaler got them on the train and pulled
the bell-cord while they were still debating the proposition. (4
]
This act of quick thinking on Shaler ’s part did much toward
saving the situation for the revolutionists.
(3) Howard C. Hill, "Roosevelt and the Caribbean," P. 61
( 4: ) H. F. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 326.
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Later in the day Colonel Torres, who had been left in com-
mand of the troops, furiously demanded transportation, Shaler
then insisted on having fares for the troops in advance. Torres
v/as not able to pay, as the generals had taken all the money
with them. Thus the troops were left stranded in Colon, with
their commanding officers on the other side of the isthmus.
The American consul at Colon cabled to Y<asbington describing
the existing situation. This cable was received there at two-
thirty-five. An hour later First Assistant Secretary of State
Loomis sent his famous message around v/hich much discussion has
centered to Felix Ehrman, American consul at Panama City. It
was as follows: "Uprising on the .isthmus reported. Keep Depart-
ment promptly and fully informed." Ehrman replied that no
uprising had as yet occurred, but that it was rumored that there
was one due that night.
The revolutionists had planned on starting action at eight
o f clock that night v/hen there v/as a band concert in the plaza.
Hov/ever, at about five o' clock, the fire brigade began the
distributions of weapons, and the revolt was on. The two
Colombian generals, Tovar and Amaya, were arrested, as was
Governor Abaldia.
Amador who was in charge, directed that the troops taking
part be drawn up next morning at the barracks. Each man was
to be given fifty dollars in gold. This was done on the morn-
ing of March 4, and there followed a demonstration in the plaza ,
General Huertas, the Colombian commanding general who had
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deserted to the revolutionists, was carried about on the
shoulders of the crowd, while Ehrrnan walked on one side with
the -American flag and Amador on the other with the new flag of
Panama. Kuerta was then given $40,000 in silver, later $50,000
in gold was added to this sum. The lesser officers were given
$10,000 each.
The revolution had been accomplished practically without
bloodshed. There were three gunboats in the harbor of Panama
City when the revolt took place. Two of these ran up the new
flag of Panama, but the third threw a number of shells into the
city. One of these killed a Chinaman, but that was the only
death result ing. (5
)
The trouble between Hubbard and Torres .
In the meantime, there had been some trouble at Colon. When
Colonel Torres found himself still in Colon on the 4th, he
became somewhat excited and threatened to kill all Americans in
the city, unless the two generals at Panama City were released.
Commander Hubbard, having heard from Washington, thereupon
notified Torres that the Colombian troops would not be allowed
to make use of the railroad.
To protect Americans in the city from danger, Hubbard had all
the men assembeld in a stone building belonging to the railroad
company. This building was fortified, and 42 men from the Nash
ville were landed to protect it. The women and children were
(5) Most of the facts relating to the actual revolt are taken
from H. F. Pringle's, "Theodore Roosevelt." His source of
authority is chiefly "The Story of Panama" - hearings on the
| Rainey resolution before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs
at Washington, in 1915.
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put on two steamers at the wharf.
Colombian troops surrounded the building containing American:
but no attack was made. Torres appeared and explained that the
whole affair was a misunderstanding. He agreed to withdraw
inland from the city if Hubbard's men retired to their ship.
When Torres failed to keep his agreement, Hubbard reoccupied
the building.
A messenger was sent to Panama City on the 4th to get
instructions for Torres from General Tovar. He returned with-
out any message. On the following afternoon, representatives
of the New Panama government conferred with Torres. They
persuaded him to embark his troops on the Royal Kail steamer
"Orinoco” and sail for Cartagena. (6 ) Hill remarks of Torres'
leaving that it was accomplished "by bribery it is said."
Latane agrees and speaks of a"generous bribe" which was given
to Torres
.
( 7
)
Withing a few days a number of American vessels had arrived
at Colon and Panama City. There was no further difficulty at
Colon, but at one time there seemed to be acute danger of
fighting breaking out between the American and Colombian troops
at Panama City. However, sensing that the situation was hope-
less Colombia submitted.
On November 6 the American minister at Bogota sent a message
to .Secretary Hay containing an offer of General Reyes io re-
16) J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," P.285
(7) John H. Latane, "United States and Latin America," P.189
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assemble the Colombia Congress and ratify the treaty as signed,
or to approve it by government decree, providing the United
States uphold Colombia by suppressing the revolution.
There seems to have been no answer sent to this message at
the time, but Roosevelt later said that he would not even
discuss the baseness of the act of deserting Panama. (8)
Cn November 7 the Colombian government sent two messages to
Washington. One of these asked if it would be allowed to land
troops at Colon and Panama City to fight along the line of the
railroad. The other notified the mraerican government that
General Reyes was being sent to Panama with power to settle witi
the rebels. Colombia wished to know if the American commander
there would cooperate with him. The only thing Colombia
demanded was that Panama continue to be subject to her sover-
eignty.
Secretary Hay replied to the first of these messages by
stating it "is not thought desirable to permit landing of
Colombian troops on the isthmus, as such a course would pre-
cipitate civil war and disturb for an indefinite period the
free transit we are pled, ed to protect." (9)
This ended any chance Colombia had of putting down the
revolt. The Republic of Panama had come into existence.
Recognition and the Treaty with Panama .
On November 6 the Panama flag was raised at Colon. Hhrraan
then sent word to Washington that freedom had been finally and
(8) J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," P. 288
(9) J. B. Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and his Time," P.287
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definitely accomplished. Roosevelt received this message at
eleven thirty-five. At twelve-fifty-one Secretary Hay instruct'
ed the American consul at Panama to recognize the de facto go
government
.
By November 10, Dr. Amador and Frederico Boyd were on their
way to the United States to sign a treaty. Without awaiting
their arrival, Bunau-Varilla got President Roosevelt to recog-
nize him as minister from Panama on November 13th. He feared
that the new republic might want a part of the canal company's
•$40,000,000.
On November 17, a treaty was signed by John Hay and Philippe
Bunau-Varilla. This treaty guaranteed the independence of
Panama. The sum of $10,000,000 was paid outright by the United
States to Panama, and an annual rental of $250,000 was to be
paid, beginning nine years later. In return, the United States
received a zone of land ten miles v/ide which was to be held in
perpetuity for the construction of a canal. The United States
was to have as full power over this zone and its adjacent
waters as if it were sovereign of it.
This treaty was ratified by the Senate in February 23, 1904
by a vote of 66 to 14. (10)
Colombia's Request for arbitration .
Colombia immediately asked that the entire matter be sub-
mitted £o arbitration. The United states refused to do this,
(10) John H. Latane, ’’The United States and Latin America,”
P. 191.
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although, it frequently made a practice of submitting disputes
to this procedure. Its refusal was beased on the ground that
it considered the question as one of a political nature.
. .
.
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VII . Reaction to Roos evelt r s Policy.
As may be suspected Roosevelt T s policy led to a great deal
of discussion and much criticism. Both of these continue to the
present
•
The Immediate Reaction.
Before turning to a systematic study of just what points of
criticism were leveled at Roosevelt and what his defense was,
the immediate reaction of the country will be briefly consider-
ed.
Turning first to the press, there are found some papers in
agreement and some in disagreement, as might be expected. The
tfew York Tribune may be accepted as one of Roosevelt f s most
enthusiastic supporters. In an editorial on the 6th, it main-
tained that the United States responsibility in Panama had been
borne with "unimpeachable propriety." It said that the United
States could not afford to be under the suspicion of having
"aided or encouraged the secession movement" even if it "secur-
ed the canal." It praised the government for "intelligent
anticipation in having forces nearby." It could find not the
slightest indication of "aid or meddling by the United States."
however, the United States was obliged by treaty to insure
"free and open transit." The conclusion was that as the United
States must eventually extend its protection to all the coun-
tries around the Caribbean, as it had to Cuba, now was a good
time to extend it to Panama and thus end "unnecessary and
wasteful civil wars." Other editorials of similar vein follow
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on several succeeding days. On the 8th it was admitted that
while the forbidding of the use of the railroad to Colombian
troops was a "hard thing" on Colombia, it was the "imperative
duty" of the United States to prevent any violation of the
treaty.
There is one point in the editorial of the 6th which must
have proved somewhat embarassing in light of later developments
It speaks of the revolutionists as "already clamoring for
%
recognition." The writer, however, believed that the State
Department would "doubtless act with prudence and deliberation.
This paper was hardly off the press when recognition was given
to the new government.
The Tribune was ready with a defense the next morning for
this action. It stated that the government merely recognized
the only government in existence there. It had to recognize
some government
.
The "Outlook" supported Roosevelt T s policy throughout. We
find the Colombian Senate denounced as a set of "robber politi-
cians" in an article in the December 12th issue. The way in
which that body handled the treaty was denounced as "an insult
to the United States." An article the following week justified
the American action as being in the interest of "all civilized
states, except Colombia." A later article defending the
recognition of the Panama Republic stated that "an Panama
government was immediately formed and proclaimed. It showed
itself from the first capable of maintaining order. On proper
proof of this, Roosevelt promptly recognized it .
"
M

On the other hand there is also severe denunciation of the
Koosevelt policy. The "Nation" as one of the periodicals
leading in this attack.
In the November 12th number the Panama revolution v/as said
to resemble "a vulgar plot." It quoted a German newspaper to
the effect that Roosevelt had been "working behind the scenes."
It stated that the "attempt to smuggle through a canal treaty
with this mushroom republic" was "shocking." It was the "most
ignominious thing we know of in the annals of .American diplo-
macy."
Turning to other expressions of opinion we find a group of
Yale’s professors protesting the American policy. The well-
known New England senator, George Hoar, a Republican, denounced
Roosevelt’s actions, saying that he hoped never "to see the day
when the interests of my country are placed above its honor. "(1
The historian, James Rhodes, a personal friend of Roosevelt,
writes of the criticism which poured from all quarters.
Did Roosevelt Participate in Promoting
the Revolution?
The most serious accusation made against Theodore Roosevelt
in relation to his policy in Panama was that he aided in foment Jl*
ing the revolution. Of the better known writers of today on
the subject, none seem to believe that there is any truth in
the charge. However, the charge was made at the time and
persisted for years. Therefore the basis upon which it rests
(1) James F. Rhodes, "The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations
P. 274
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will be examined to see just what evidence supports it.
Persons making the accusation first point to the article
written by Bunau-Varilla for the Paris newspaper "Le Matin"
on September 2. In this article the coming events in Panama
were forecast with an uncanny accuracy.
another article of a similar nature entitled "What If
Panama Should Revolt" appeared in the November issue of the
"Review of Reviews", edited by Albert Shaw, a close personal
friend of President Roosevelt. Once again the future was out-
lined with great accuracy.
The visits of Cromwell and Bunau-Varilla to Loomis, Hay and
Roosevelt are cited as a third reason for belief in the compli-
city of the president. These two canal company representatives
everyone knew to be connected with the revolutionary activities
in Panama.
The premature message sent asking for a report of the revo-
lution which had not yet taken place is another bit of evidence
frequently submitted.
The last and most important link in the chain of evidence
is tne speed wibn which me Repuoiic or Panama was recognized.
This removed all doubt from the minds of many only too ready to
believe that President Roosevelt had promoted the revolt.
What of the evidence which tends to offset all this?
Considering first Bunau-Varilla f s article and his later
activities, the situation is pretty well summed up in Roosevelt 1
own words. He described the engineer as "a very able fellow"
who could "no doubt" make "a very shrewd guess" as to the
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action of the American government. There seems to he no douht
that Bunau-Varilla felt quite positive that the United States
would use the Treaty of 1846 as an excuse for aiding the
revolutionists. A thorough knowledge of the general situation
and a keen intelligence seems to be basis for this belief.
The only assurance he seems to have received from Kay or Roose-
velt was that in case of revolt the United States naval forces
would maintain open communications across the isthmus. Thayer
states that such was the case.
Turning to Shaw’s article, there is found in the very letter
which probably caused the writing of the article, Roosevelt T s
statement that he could not foment a revolt, though he would be
delighted if Panama "made itself so (independent) at this
moment." In other private letters at the time, he disclaimed
any intention of bringing about a revolt. In a letter to Shaw
on November 6, he repeats that he did not foment the revolu-
tion, but went on "unless Congress oVerrrides me Colombia’s
grip on Panama is gone forever. (2)
One thing that seems to dispute beyond all doubt the
probability of Roosevelt’s having brought on the revolution is
the incontrovertible fact that he spent a good deal of time
during October in preparing a message to Congress which advises
the buying of the canal company’s rights and then going ahead
without regard to Colombia’s wishes. It seems impossible to
anyone having any knowledge of Roosevelt ’s nharacoer that he
(2) J.B.Bishop, "Theodore Roosevelt and Kis Time
,
P. 288
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would spend much, time and energy in carefully working out such
a message if he were at the same time busy in instigating a
revolt in Panama.
Roosevelt T s hasty recognition of Panama, without precedent
in American history, was undoubtedly due to his desire to get
the matter settled before Congress met again. He knew that
that body would try to force upon him the Nicaragua route under
the Spooner amendment. By now he was more than ever determined
on the Panama route. His message to Congress in relation to
Panama shows this to be true. He said that the only question
to be settled then was ratification, as what had already
happened could not be undone.
Other Points of Attack on Roosevelt's Policy
The other points of attack on the Roosevelt policy in Panama
are found best summarized in the list of grievances which
General Reyes presented on behalf of Colombia. There are five
of more importance than the rest in his list which are as
follows
:
First, American cruisers were sent to Colombian waters with
orders to prevent Colombian troops from landing to suppress a
revolutionary uprising. Second, a military officer of the
United States prevented the railroad from carrying Colombian
troops from Colon to Panama at the very time that their arrival
would have impeded the revolutionary attempt. Third, in a time
of peace between Colombia and the United States, the latter
prevented the landing of troops when they were necessary to
restore order. Fourth, the quick recognition of the Republic
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of Panama by the United States. Fifth, the quick treatjr which
guaranteed Panama r s indipendence and agreed to open a canal.
What wa s the defense of the United States in the face of
these accusations?
First, Roosevelt’s special message to Congress on January 4,
1904 in explanation of his actions will be considered. He
started with an attack on Colombia, stating that it was not
entitled "to bar the transit of the world T s traffic across the
isthmus •
"
He justified American intervention on three grounds. The
first of these was that the primary object of the Treaty of
1846 was the building of a canal, the implication being that
the United States would be allowed to build it. Therefore,
Colombia r s rejection of the Hay-Herran Treaty repudiated the
earlier treaty.
Furthermore, under this treaty the United States had
guaranteed to protect Colombia from external attack, and now
having recognized Panama as Colombia’s lawful successor it was
equally bound to protect her.
A second reason for intervention was the preservation of the
national interests and safety of the United States. Delay
would have led to trouble with France. In addition each day’s
delay in the building of the canal was a day’s delay in
securing the safety of the United States.
A final reason for action v/as that it was demanded by
the interests of "collective civilization."
1 r
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The defense offered by Secretary Hay in answer to Reyes T
charges also starts with an attack on Colombia.
Colombia, he said dealt fairly with the United States while
Nicaragua was under consideration, but changed its attitude
once the agreement had been made with Colombian representatives
and the Trench company regarding Panama. Because of this
shifting policy the interests of Panama were threatened, thus
the inhabitants considered secession. The United States know-
ing the situation took steps to maintain order.
Turning next to the 1846 treaty, Hay pointed out that this
treaty was signed with the implied obligation that a canal was
to be built and the guarantee of New Granda’s sovereignty was
given for this reason. The design of the treaty was unful-
filled, and apparently only could be fulfilled with a United
States government canal. By repudiating the Hay-Herran agree-
ment, Colombia was violating the spirit of the Treaty of 1846.
The declaration of independence by Panama created a new
situation. A civil war there threatened the interest of the
world. Panama stood for the world's interest, while Colombia
stood ooposed. The United States, not being responsible for
the situation, naturally threw her influence to Panama, and
recognized her independence
. (3
)
Such were the defenses offered by the President of the
United States and his Secretary of State. How well do they
stand up?
(3) The summary of Reyes' grievance and also that of Hay's ans-
wer are taken from G.H.Stuart ' s . "Lat in America and United States
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In the first place, in answer to the contention of both men
that the chief aim of the United States in making the Treaty
of 1846 was the building of a canal, most historical authori-
ties do not agree that such was the case. Therefore, the
argument that Colombia was violating the spirit of this treaty
in rejecting the Hay-Herran convention falls flat.
The fact that delay in the building of the canal endangered
America's interests and safety rests upon the theory that
"necessity knows no lav/." ±ls to possible trouble with France,
that country had notified the United States that she supported
the canal company in no way. Thus, trouble with France seems
decidedly unlikely irregardless of what happened.
It may also be said that if American safety demanded
immediate action on the matter of building a canal, the United
States could have turned to Nicaragua.
The answer to Roosevelt's contention that the United States
were acting on behalf of the civilized world was best given a
number of years later by William Jennings Bryan when he was
Secretary of State. He said that the United States was under
the circumstances putting itself in the position "of exercising
the right of eminent domain in the interest of the world's
commerce .
"
It is generally admitted by authorities on the subject that
the United States had the right to keep the railroad open. How-
ever, to quote Stuart, "The United States could hardly claim
the right to prevent the landing of soldiers to put down a
’ I
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a rebellion against the sovereign state that granted this right,
Furthermore, the United states had guaranteed the sovereignty
of Colombia in Panama in the 1846 treaty. It had now refused
that country the right to land troops to retain her sovereignty,
Latane points out that Roosevelt’s position that the
guarantee given in the Treaty of 1846 applied to the world at
large is not well taken. He insists that such guarantees
affected only Colombia.
Thus, it is found that all of Hay’s and Roosevelt’s argu-
ments in defense of their action can be readily answered.
Colombia seems undoubtedly to have the stronger case.
Roosevelt’s hater statement s.
The real situation seems to have been that Roosevelt had set
his heart on Panama, and the difficulties surrounding his
efforts to get it merely spurred him on. The insurrection
offered an opportunity which he seized, and was thus enabled to
meet Congress, whom he feared would press Nicaragua on him,
with the accomplished fact of an independent Panama. Of course,
he had to offer a defense at the the, and seized upon what
points he could in building up an argument.
Later in life, he was somewhat freer in his statements, and
they go to prove the truth of what is written above.
On March 23, 1911 in an address of the University of Califor-
nia, Roosevelt said, ”1 took the Canal Zone and let Congress
debate, and while the debate goes on the canal does also."
Statements of a similar nature were also made in other addresses
..
'
.
.
r
86
and in private letters. Thayer, a life-long friend of the
President tells in his biography of the latter that Roosevelt
assured him that he would have seized the canal on behalf of
civilization, if Colombia had not come to terms.
However, in spite of the spirit shown by the above state-
ments Roosevelt and his friends continued in seeking further
points of defense of his action. In his "Autobiography”
Roosevelt presents a vigorous defense of his action. The chief
points of this defense are as follows. Hirst, that Panama had
a right to independence on the "consent of the governed" theory
’
and would have had it years before except for the interference
of the United States. Second, that Colombia had surrendered
her sovereignty in Panama by asking for American military aid
there on a number of occasions. Third, that Colombia, under
the dictatorship of Maroquin, exhibited a constant lack of good
faith in her dealings. And fourth, that the United States had
accepted the responsibility before the world of building a
canal and was morally obliged to do so. (4)
On February 22, 1904, Hlihu Root presented in Chicago what
many consider to be the ablest defense ever made of Roosevelt f s
policy in Panama. His argument centers largely around Panama’s
right to independence, as shown by her history for over a half
century.
(4) Theodore Roosevelt, "^.n autobiography," P. 553.- 565
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Latin American Reaction and -attempts of the
United States to Better Matters .
The American action in Panama had resulted in the generation
of feelings of fear and distrust of the United States all
through Latin America. At the same time many people in the
United States believed that we had acted in a very high-handed
manner. Thus, it is not very surprising to find resolutions
soon being introduced in Congress to effect moves which would
pacify Colombia.
Supporters of such moves seem to be divided into two
classes. First, those that felt that the United States had
done Colombia a wrong which should be righted, insofar as
possible. The other group seem to have been chiefly interested
in the development of Latin American trade and the exploitation
of her natural resources. They felt that it was to the
financial benefit of the United States to make a satisfactory
adjustment of the situation.
The chief opposition to all such moves came from a small
group of congressmen who were personal friends of Theodore
Roosevelt. Their leader was Eenry Cabot Lodge. While this
group were for the most part ready to make a financial settle-
ment, they were always ready to fight any accompanying message
which was in any way in the nature of an apology for American
conduct
•
As a result of this situation, there was a continual dead-
lock existing over a number of years. Thus, action which had
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been started in Taft r s administration finally culminated in
the Harding administration, when payment of 325,000,000 was
made to Colombia in 1921.
There is unfortunately a veil of suspicion surrounding the
passage of this resolution. Lodge, who had been the leading
opponent of previous motions, spoke in favor on this occasion.
He stated that Colombia was inclined to discriminate against
the United States in giving oil field concessions. However,
payment of the -325,000,000 advocated would result in a treaty
which would "improve our opportunities - of making secure these
concessions
.
(5 ) Lodge said further that through information
received in a letter from albert B. Hall, he believed that
Roosevelt would have approved the resolution were he still
alive. This letter described a conversation between Hall and
Roosevelt
•
Thus the smear of oil which touched so many of the acts of
the Harding administration seems to rest also in this. Pringle
calls it a "fitting climax" to the whole story of Panama.
In addition to the frequent resolutions which came into
Congress, other steps were taken to better the situation with
our South American neighbors. Llihu Root made a good-will tour
to Latin America in 1906 which had a helpful effect. Then in
1909, Root undertook to establish friendly relations with
Colombia through the negotiation of three treaties in Washing-
(5) H. H. Pringle, "Theodore Roosevelt," P. 331-2
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ton. One of these was between the United States and Panama,
and a third between Colombia and Panama. Colombia rejected
the treaties, and the envoy participating in the making of the
treaty was forced to flee the country because of popular indig-
nation.
What Became of the S40.000.000 Paid the
Canal Company?
One of the mysteries of the Panama affair is what happened
to the ^40,000,000 which the United States government paid to
the New Panama Canal Company. Who were the members of this
company? Two congressional investigating committees and any
number of private investigators have failed to uncover their
names. It now seems likely to remain always a mystery.
Roosevelt wrote Philander Knox that Cromwell had sent him a
complete list of the stockholders of the company. Such a list
was never made public, and nor does one exist among Roosevelt ’s
papers in the Library of Congress. Cromwell said that a
complete list existed in the Paris office of the canal company.
This was found not to be true.
A third company of which little is known was organized in
New Jersey in 1899. It was incorporated under the name of the
"Panama Canal Company of America." Its purpose was to excnange
its securities for those of the New Panama Canal Company. The
incorporators were clerks in Cromwell’s law office and *5,000,
CC0 in stock was subscribed.
=
*• •
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•iyil that is known definitely is that the ^40,CCC,CC0 was
paid by the government to the J. P. Morgan Company of New York
for transmission to the canal company. After that all is dark
This secrecy has added to the suspicious light in which the
whole affair of Panama is regarded.
-.
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Summary .
The fifty-eight years of diplomacy relating to an isthmian
canal, which elapsed betv/een the making of the Treaty of 1846
and the ratification of the iiay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty in 1904,
had places in which the highest standards of international
relations were attained and other places in which Americans can
feel little pride in contemplating.
The climax to these relations was reached with Roosevelt T s
recognition of the Republic of Panama. This action, in
addition to resulting in much criticism in the United States,
caused entire Latin America to become less friendly in its
attitude. There resulted a considerable loss in American
commerce to the South, ^f^er long years of effort, the situa-
tion was somewhat eased by the payment of )25,0C0,C00 to
Colombia in 1921.
In studying any historical event, it is well to consider it
in the light of the time or back-ground in which it occurred.
The Panama affair came soon after the Spanish-American War,
just when the spirit of imperialism was at its height in the
United States.
One of the most important of the factors in Roosevelt T s
"taking” of the canal Zone is the type of politician who
represents the Latin American countries. All others having
dealings with these countries are continually troubled by the
unreliability of the government officials representing them.
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There is case after case which proves this to be true. A
person of Theodore Roosevelt T s temperament was absolutely un-
suited to deal with these individuals. Their method of
diplomatic inter-course went against the grain of everything
that was in the character of Roosevelt. To one with a know-
ledge of his character, his reaction seems a perfectly natural
one. It is unfortunate that it proved so harmful to the
country he so deeply loved. However, the canal he hastened to
completion has greatly aided most of the countries of the
world, including the one which was so deeply offended by his
action
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